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The author surveys and discusses recent decisions and legisla-
tion touching on all aspects of commercial law. Among other
topics, this survey examines decisions dealing with sales of
goods, products liability, negotiable instruments, sureties and
guarantors, mortgages, banking, consumer protection, security
agreements, and newly enacted legislation on both the state
and the federal level.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey attempts to review all recent cases and legislation
arising in Florida under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) or
in areas outside of the U.C.C. but within commercial law practice.
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. Jurisdiction
Recent developments demonstrate that an essential element of
Florida long-arm jurisdiction is that nonresidents maintain a regu-
lar Florida marketing agent or trade associate. Thus, an out-of-
state carpet manufacturer who had his Florida carpeting distribu-
tor effect a sale to a Florida installer thereby became subject to in
personam jurisdiction in Florida.' Although the foreign manufac-
turer sent the carpet directly to the Florida installer and bypassed
the distributor in the transaction in question, the court held that
the manufacturer fell within section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes
2
1. Pace Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Life Carpet & Tile Co., 365 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 4th DCA
1978).
2. FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1979). The plaintiff effected service of process under subsection
(1)(a) of the statute, which provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident who "[olperates,
conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or business venture in this state or has an
office ... in this state" for any cause of action arising out of such activity.
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(the Florida long-arm statute). The court stated that the defen-
dant corporation's conduct in carrying on business in Florida
through its local distributor provided sufficient contact with Flor-
ida to satisfy due process standards. '
In Aero Mechanical Electronic Craftsman v. Parent,4 a Cali-
fornia plastics manufacturer (Aero) injected plastic into toilet
molds supplied by another California corporation. Aero then sold
the toilets to a third California manufacturer, which used them to
produce portable toilets. The third manufacturer then sold the
finished toilets to a California distributor, which sold them to
Sears, Roebuck & Co. in Chicago. Sears then distributed the toilets
to a Sears store in Hollywood, Florida. The store sold one of the
toilets to a customer who was injured when the toilet collapsed.
The customer sued Sears and the California distributor; the
defendants filed a third-party complaint impleading the original
California plastics manufacturer, Aero, under section
48.193(1)(f)(2) of the Florida Statutes. The district court held that
the statutory phrase "in the ordinary course of commerce" should
be interpreted to mean that a nonresident manufacturer "must at
least have some reason to anticipate that his product will reach
another state in the ordinary course of interstate commerce"
before he would be subject to long-arm jurisdiction. The mere
presence of his product in this state was not sufficient to render a
manufacturer subject to Florida jurisdiction. The court held that
to allow jurisdiction over the original California manufacturer
would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice" 7 and give the Florida long-arm statute an unconstitutional
interpretation.8
3. 365 So. 2d at 446.
4. 366 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
5. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(f)(2) (1979) provides that a corporation submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the state if it:
(f) Causes injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an
act or omission outside of this state by the defendant, provided that at the time
of the injury either:
2. Products [or] materials . . . manufactured by the defendant anywhere
were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce,
trade, or use, and the use or consumption resulted in the injury.
6. 366 So. 2d at 1270.
7. Id. at 1270 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
8. 366 So. 2d at 1271. Courts in Florida have traditionally required a more substantial
contact with the state than the mere possibility that the product might enter the state. Id.
at 1270. Under the International Shoe standard, the statute would be unconstitutional if
applied to a foreign manufacturer who lacked minimum contacts with Florida.
1980]
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In a similar case, an Illinois company which manufactured tilt
mechanisms for office chairs sold one of these units to an Indiana
chair manufacturer. The Indiana manufacturer then shipped the
finished chair directly to a Florida buyer who was injured when the
chair fell over. When the buyer sued, the manufacturer filed a
third-party complaint against the tilt mechanism manufacturer for
indemnity.9 The court held that Florida had no jurisdiction over
the Illinois manufacturer under section 48.181 of the Florida Stat-
utes,1" because the company had no corporate agent in Florida and
no role in the sale of the finished chair.
11
B. Choice of Law
Recent Florida decisions have dealt variously with the choice
of law conflict involving an interstate transaction and an interna-
tional sale. One court applied traditional conflicts doctrine to an
interstate sale, while another court, without apparent deliberation,
applied the Florida U.C.C. to a sales contract between a Mexican
and a Floridian.
In Boat Town U.S.A., Inc. v. Mercury Marine Division of
Brunswick Corp.,12 a Florida district court applied ordinary con-
flict of laws doctrine to an agreement in which a Wisconsin manu-
facturer granted a franchise to its Florida dealer for the sale of the
manufacturer's products. The franchise-sales contract was renewa-
ble each year at the election of the manufacturer. The manufac-
turer refused to renew; the franchisee refused to pay for previously
delivered goods, and the manufacturer sued to recover. The fran-
chisee counterclaimed, alleging that the actions of the manufac-
9. Seng Co. v. Burke, 366 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
10. FLA. STAT. § 48.181 (1979). The statute provides that:
(1) The acceptance by . . . all foreign corporations . . . of the privilege
extended by law to nonresidents and others to operate, conduct, engage in, or
carry on a business or business venture in the state, or to have an office or
agency in the state, constitutes an appointment by the persons and foreign cor-
porations of the secretary of state of the state as their agent on whom all process
in any action or proceeding against them, or any of them, arising out of any
transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business
venture may be served.
11. 366 So. 2d at 534. If the chair manufacturer had given the tilt mechanism manufac-
turer notice of the suit which satisfied the requirements of § 672.607(5)(a) of the Florida
Statutes, the tilt mechanism manufacturer's election not to come in and defend the action
would have resulted in his being bound by factual findings made by the Florida court that
would be common to any future litigation by the chair manufacturer against him. U.C.C. §
2-607(5)(a).
12. 364 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
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turer in failing to renew violated the Wisconsin Fair Dealership
Law.13 The franchisee asserted that Wisconsin law governed the
contract because of the following clause:14
II. INTERPRETATION. This Agreement and all its provi-
sions are to be interpreted and construed according to the laws
of the State of Wisconsin. Any provision of this contract which
in any wise contravenes or is unenforceable under any law of the
nation of the state or states in which this agreement is effective
shall be deemed separable and not to be part of this
agreement.1 5
The appellate court held that this clause determined only what law
applied in interpreting the contract, not what law was to govern
the contract. The terms of the contract contained no ambiguities;
thus, under Florida law, the court could not construe the contract.
The interpretation clause, therefore, had no effect and provided no
explicit choice of Wisconsin law to govern the parties' conduct.' 6
Nevertheless, the court held that under ordinary principles of
conflict of laws, Wisconsin law governed the validity, interpreta-
tion, and rights and obligations because the contact was executed
and most of the acts were performed in Wisconsin. Further, the
Wisconsin legislative policy against conduct forbidden by the Fair
Dealership Law was to be enforced by a Florida court in the ab-
sence of a compelling reason militating against such enforcement.
The absence of such a countervailing policy, together with the pro-
tection afforded a Florida resident, led the court to apply Wiscon-
sin law.1
7
In a decision that ignored a possible conflict of laws problem,
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, recently applied Flor-
ida law to a sale between a Florida seller and a Mexican buyer.' 8
The sales contract contained neither an express agreement as to
the risk of loss in transit, nor any of the commonly recognized de-
livery abbreviations, such as F.O.B. or C.I.F.' e The buyer con-
13. WIs. STAT. §§ 135.01-.07 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
14. 364 So. 2d at 17.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 18, 19.
18. Pestana v. Karinol Corp., 367 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
19. According to § 2-319(1)(a) of the U.C.C., when the term in a sales contract is F.O.B.
place of shipment, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are duly delivered to
the carrier for shipment to the buyer. Under § 2-319(1)(b) of the U.C.C., if the term is
F'O.B. place of destination, the seller bears the risk of loss until tender of delivery to the
buyer. Comment 1 to § 2-320 of the U.C.C. provides that a contract with the term C.I.F. is a
1980]
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tended that the notation on their contract that the goods were to
be sent to Mexico indicated that the contract was a destination
contract. In a destination contract, the risk of loss on the goods
sold would not pass to the buyer until delivery, so the seller would
bear the loss for goods which failed to arrive in Mexico.2
The court rejected this argument, stating that a "send to" or
"ship to" term is a part of every contract which involves the trans-
portation of goods; the use of these terms has no bearing on
whether a contract is a shipment or a destination contract.2 1 The
court held, under principles of the U.C.C., that a contract other-
wise silent was a "shipment" contract with the risk of loss on the
buyer from the moment the goods were properly delivered to the
carrier in Florida. This holding is correct if one assumes that the
U.C.C. governs the contract. Unfortunately, the court devoted no
attention to the possible conflict of laws problem.
2 2
C. Express Warranties
An extension of warranty doctrine to the retail sale of a dia-
mond ring underlines the need for sellers to distinguish product
descriptions from opinions as to value. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, held that an express warranty arises by law
when a retail seller gives a description of the ring which becomes
the basis of the bargain. In Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v.
Conley, s the seller had given the buyer a report from the GIA
which described the ring as being flawless and of a "D" color grade,
in addition to a document entitled "Jewelry Appraisal for Insur-
ance Purposes," which used similar language as to quality and
stated that the ring had a certain replacement value. The court
held that the statements as to quality were part of the basis of the
bargain, not mere opinions of the seller as to value.2" Thus, the two
shipment contract, with the risk of loss for the goods passing to the buyer upon delivery by
the seller to the carrier.
20. Id. at 1100.
21. Id.
22. The court applied FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 672.319(1)(b), .503, Comment 5, .509(1) (West
1966). Under traditional conflict of laws analysis, questions of interpretation, such as risk of
loss, are governed by the law of the place where the contract was made. If the court had
analyzed this problem and had concluded that the contract had been entered into in Mex-
ico, then the U.C.C. provisions adopted in Florida would not apply and Mexican law would
have governed.
23. 372 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
24. Id. at 969. The court rejected the seller's attempt to come within subsection (2) of
the statute (which stipulates that a statement of the seller's opinion would not create an
express warranty) because the statute does not exclude the "opinions" of third parties. Id.
[Vol. 34:499
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documents constituted express warranties under section 2-313 of
the U.C.C.25 The court then held that under section 2-714 of the
U.C.C.26 the buyer could recover damages equalling the difference
between the value of the goods as accepted and the value of the
goods as warranted.
This author submits that appraisal statements should now be
labeled with conspicuous language to the effect that the appraisal
is a matter of opinion and not of fact, since individual assessments
will inevitably vary. Furthermore, the seller should expressly dis-
claim any intention to consider the appraisal part of the basis of
the bargain.
D. Miscellaneous Problems in the Sale of Goods
Liberal application of legal doctrine and statutes has marked
recent commercial decisions. For example, the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, held that parol evidence can be introduced
to ascertain the legal existence or binding force of a contract when
there is a factual question whether the named purchaser was the
actual purchaser. The court allowed the introduction of parol evi-
dpnce that a car was actually purchased by a third party as an
architectural fee for the named "purchasers," holding that this oral
testimony created a question of fact which precluded summary
judgment for the plaintiffs.27
In three cases, the courts read statutes so as not to require the
enforcement of particular agreements. In one, when a washing ma-
chine company entered into contracts with a condominium devel-
oper to supply the buildings with washing machines, service, and
repairs, a court allowed the contract to be cancelled by the condo-
minium association that took control of the buildings from the de-
veloper." The court relied on former section 711.13(4) and current
section 711.66(5) of the Florida Statutes, construing the words
25. FLA. STAT. § 672.313 (1979). Subsection (1)(b) of the statute provides: "Any descrip-
tion of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the description."
26. FLA. STAT. § 672.714 (1979). Subsection 2 of the statute provides that: "The mea-
sure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance
between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had
been as warranted .... "
27. Bleemer v. Keenan Motors, Inc., 367 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
28. Wash & Dry, Inc. v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, 368 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th DCA
1979).
29. FLA. STAT. § 711.13(4) (1973) was replaced by FLA. STAT. § 711.66(5) (1975). The
latter statute has since been incorporated into FLA. STAT. §§ 718.301, .302, 719.301, .302
19801
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"maintenance, management, or operation of condominium prop-
erty" to include contracts to supply personal property, such as
washing machines, used in the operation of the condominium. The
court rejected the argument that the statutes were intended to ap-
ply only to real property.30
In a second case, a contract for the production and grinding of
sugar cane, which based the price on the formulas and regulations
established by the United States Department of Agriculture under
the United States Sugar Act of 1948,81 was held to be unenforce-
able after the Act expired. Basing the contract price on regulations
and price formulas which no longer existed constituted a sufficient
ground to terminate the contract."'
Finally, in answering a certified question from the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that the Florida wholesale liquor discount statute was not intended
to follow the model of the comparable federal law."3 Federal regu-
lations permit discounts only to the extent that volume purchases
by retailers bear a reasonable relationship to cost savings on behalf
of the wholesaler.8 4 The court held that under Florida law, a liquor
wholesaler may sell to a retailer on the basis of a discount given
"at the time of the sale and made available to all vendors buying
similar quantities, regardless of laid-in cost or the savings attribu-
table to quantity sales."" It was clear to the court that the legisla-
ture did not intend to regulate the amount of the discount, as long
as the other statutory requirements were followed. Appellees had
argued that the court's ruling would make it impossible for indi-
vidual retailers to compete with retailers selling liquor at multiple
locations, because the larger discounts given to retailers with mul-
tiple locations would allow them to sell at a lower price. The court
responded that the legislature could best handle such a policy
question. 6
(1977). The statute now applicable to these facts is FLA. STAT. § 718.302 (1979), which pro-
vides in part that a contract for the operation, maintenance, or management of a condomin-
ium association, made prior to the assumption of control of the association by unit owners
other than the developer, may later be canceled by the unit owners.
30. 368 So. 2d at 51.
31. Sugar Act of 1948, ch. 519, § 1, 61 Stat. 922 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8(a),
80 Stat. 649 (1966)).
32. Osceola Farms Co. v. Wilder Bros. Farms, Inc., 364 So. 2d 43, 44 (Fla. 4th DCA
1978).
33. Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. Simon, 367 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. 1979).
34. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS Rulings 74-6, 74-8.
35. 367 So. 2d at 615.
36. Id. at 616.
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E. Damages for Breach
The District Court of Appeal, First District, recently held that
for a seller to recover prejudgment interest on an unpaid debt, the
amount of interest due must be a liquidated sum. 37 If at the date
the debt is due the amount of interest owed is unliquidated, no
prejudgment interest should be granted.
Although most attacks on liquidated damage clauses spring
from the premise that such damages exact a penalty when unrea-
sonably large, a recent case found the stipulated damages to be
unreasonably low. In Varner v. B.L. Lanier Fruit Co.,88 the con-
tract provided that the seller sell 22,000 boxes of oranges at $1.25
per box, and that the buyer make an advance payment of $11,000
to serve as liquidated damages. The buyer picked 12,000 boxes of
fruit but refused to pick the equivalent of 9,500 boxes of oranges
remaining on the trees. The buyer had paid the seller $16,000 (in-
cluding the deposit of $11,000) before his failure to pick the re-
mainder. The seller contended that the application of the liqui-
dated damage clause could deny him any remedy for the unpicked
fruit, as the buyer had picked enough fruit to use up his deposit.
The court agreed with the seller that in accordance with comment
1 to section 2-718 of the U.C.C.,39 an unreasonably small amount of
liquidated damages might be unconscionable under section 2-302.4o
Further, even if the seller could not prove that the clause was un-
conscionable, section 2-719(2) of the U.C.C. might provide relief if,
under the circumstances, the agreed upon remedy "failed of its es-
sential purpose. ' '41 Remedies would then lie as provided under
other sections of article 2 of the U.C.C.
4
2
In the event- that a buyer breaches a contract for the purchase
of a business, damages are to be measured by subtracting the mar-
ket value of the business at the time of the breach from the con-
37. Parker's Mechanical Contractor's, Inc. v. Eastpoint Water & Sewer Dist., 367 So. 2d
665 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
38. 370 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
39. FLA. STAT. § 672.718 (1979). U.C.C. § 2-718, Comment 1 provides that "[a] term
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is expressly made void as a penalty. An unrea-
sonably small amount would be subject to similar criticism and might be stricken under the
section on unconscionable contracts or clauses."
40. FLA. STAT. § 672.302 (1979). Subsection (1) provides: "If the court as a matter of law
finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may. . . enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscion-
able clause ...."
41. Id. § 672.719(2) (1979) provides in part: "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this code."
42. 370 So. 2d at 63.
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tract price, minus any prior payments. This may be supported by
evidence of the amount for which the business was later sold.43
III. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Express Warranty
In two cases, the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
strictly applied (or misapplied) warranty law to hold that the con-
tracts at issue created no express warranty. In one case, the court
correctly held that when a manufacturer expressly warrants its
tires for use on American cars, the warranty will not apply if the
tires are used on a foreign car." The court neglected to consult the
Code in the other case, however, in holding that a seller's oral
statement that a warehouse had a "good ten year roof" was not an
express warranty because it could not have induced the sale."' Ap-
parently thinking the transaction was a sale of goods, the court
cited the sales portions of Corpus Juris Secundum"' and American
Jurisprudence.7 If a sale of goods had been involved, the court
would have been well advised to have considered section 672.313 of
the Florida Statutes"' with its accompanying comments. That sec-
tion provides that a seller's affirmation of fact relating to the goods
creates an express warranty regardless of whether the buyer relies
on the statement.4e Of additional significance was the court's hold-
ing that roof repairs would not toll the running of the four-year
statute of limitations.
50
43. Redmond v. Prosper, Inc., 364 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); see Beverage Can-
ners, Inc. v. Cott Corp., 372 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), in which the court refused to
award substantial damages to a franchisee for the breach of a contract for a soft drink bot-
tling franchise. The court held that all of the proffered evidence was too speculative. Id. at
956. The terse opinion seems to indicate that the franchisor breached the agreement before
the franchisee actually commenced bottling operations; thus, lacking a "track record," the
franchisee unsuccessfully attempted to prove damages for lost profits by a number of specu-
lative means.
44. Stabinski v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 371 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
45. K/F Dev. & Inv. Corp. v. Williamson Crane & Dozer Corp., 367 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1979).
46. 77 C..S. Sales § 309 (1952).
47. 67 AM. JUR. 2d Sales § 437 (1973).
48. FLA. STAT. § 672.313(1)(a) (1979) provides: "Any affirmation of fact or promise
made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise."
49. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.313, Comment (West 1966) states: "Note that in subsection
(1)(a), the element of reliance by the buyer has been eliminated from the definition of an
express warranty."




During the past year, litigation based on implied warranty or
product liability gave Florida courts abundant opportunity to res-
urrect or rebuke old doctrines.
In a case of first impression, the children and personal repre-
sentative of a deceased sought damages for mental pain and suffer-
ing when the casket for their decedent fell apart during the burial.
The court held that neither the manufacturer of the casket nor the
funeral home that sold the casket was liable for such damages,
under the long-established Florida rule that there can be no recov-
ery for pain and suffering without a showing of impact."' Plaintiffs
did not fall within the narrow exception to the impact rule, which
allows recovery for conduct so exceeding the bounds reasonably
tolerated by society as to imply malice or entire want of care, be-
cause they failed to allege such conduct. Plaintiffs did, however,
recover the cost of the casket and all damages except for mental
pain and suffering"' based on breach of implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness and on strict liability in tort.
In another case of first impression in Florida, the supreme
court extended the "crashworthiness doctrine" 3  to cover
motorcycles as well as automobiles.54 The doctrine will apply in
negligence cases as well as actions for breach of warranty of
merchantability and for strict liability in tort55 under section 402A
of the Restatement of Torts."
A second doctrine that time had almost forgotten was appar-
ently revived by the District Court of Appeal, First District.5 The
"patent danger" rule provides that a manufacturer is under no
duty to warn users of its inherently dangerous products when the
51. Estate of Harper v. Orlando Funeral Home, Inc., 366 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA
1979).
52. Id. at 129.
53. 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976). The doctrine required the auto manufacturer to use
reasonable care in the design and manufacture of its product to eliminate unreasonable risk
of foreseeable injury. Id. at 204.
54. Nicolodi v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 370 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The
crashworthiness doctrine is an aspect of the basic principles of negligence and is based on
the concept of foreseeability. Because motorcycles are as likely as cars to be involved in an
accident, the doctrine should apply equally to motorcycles.
55. Id. at 72.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states that liability may be im-
posed on a manufacturer who produces a defective product which is unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property, when such defect causes physical harm to the
ultimate user or consumer or to his property.
57. Hethcoat v. Chevron Oil Co., 364 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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user should know of such dangers. In a case involving a hot asphalt
machine which had exploded and killed a welder attempting to re-
pair it, the court upheld a directed verdict in favor of the manufac-
turer of the machine, because the machine in this case was not
defective. The manufacturer had no duty to warn, because the
danger of using an acetylene torch in the presence of oil fumes
(from the hot oil used to heat asphalt) was obvious." Judge Smith
dissented, arguing that the "patent danger" rule had been dis-
carded and that whether the machine was improperly designed for
venting and whether adequate warnings were given about the need
for removing all fumes were questions for the jury."
Judge Smith's view prevailed when the Supreme Court of
Florida subsequently rejected the "patent danger" doctrine. 0 Ac-
cording to the court, the rule operated to relieve manufacturers of
all liability for dangerous products if the danger was obvious. The
court held that the obvious nature of a danger constitutes not an
exception to liability, but a defense to be used by the manufacturer
to show that the injured party did not use the reasonable degree of
care required under the facts of the particular case. The court ad-
ded that the principles of comparative negligence may be used by a
manufacturer making this defense."
In Lee v. C. & P. Service Corp.," the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that a truck servicer who merely fills the brake
cylinder with brake fluid, and does no other brake work, cannot be
said to give an implied warranty. Accordingly, the servicer was not
liable for the death of a motorcyclist killed in a collision with the
truck when the truck's brake failed. The court found that sections
672.314 and 672.315 of the Florida Statutes,13 on which the plain-
tiff relied, applied only to a seller of goods, and that the truck ser-
vicer was not a seller of goods within the meaning of those sec-
tions. The court also held that a statement by an employee of the
truck servicer that the brakes were in good condition and should
give no trouble, did not constitute an express warranty, but only
the serviceman's opinion.
A recent decision on evidence in products liability cases may
58. Id. at 1244.
59. Id. at 1245.
60. Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979), aff'g 353 So. 2d 917
(Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (overruling Farmhand, Inc. v. Brandies, 327 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA
1976)).
61. 366 So. 2d at 1172.
62. 363 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
63. FLA. STAT. §§ 672.314, .315 (1979).
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force defendants to hire plaintiffs' expert witnesses whose testi-
mony proves adverse to plaintiffs. A trial judge may refuse a defen-
dant's request to admit adverse deposition testimony of a plain-
tiff's expert where the plaintiff has decided not to call the expert
as a witness at trial." This author suggests that to avoid this result
the defendant manufacturer must call the expert as its own expert
witness, although this may require the defendant to pay the fees of
the expert witness.
C. Negligence
Workers' compensation law played a role in two notable Flor-
ida negligence suits. In one action, the court pointed out that Flor-
ida Department of Commerce Workers' Compensation Bureau reg-
ulations apply only to relationships between employers and
employees.6 5 Accordingly, rules governing the construction of scaf-
folding have no application to scaffolding built by a supplier for
use by the employees of the general contractor. Thus, in a suit by
the employee against the supplier, a trial court should refuse to
charge that a violation of this regulation by the supplier would be
neither negligence per se under Florida Standard Jury Instruction
No. 4.9 nor evidence of negligence under Instruction No. 4.11.66
In another action, a court did apply the standards of workers'
compensation law. 7 An employee sued the manufacturer of his
employer's punch press to recover for injuries he suffered while us-
ing the machine. The court allowed the defendant manufacturer to
show that the accident in 1973 was caused by the failure of the
employer to attach a guard to the machine. Immune from suit
under the workers' compensation law, the employer was not a
party to the action.6 8 The defendant had a right nevertheless to
show that the fault of a third party had proximately caused the
accident. Further, the manufacturer was entitled to introduce stan-
dards of the American National Standards Institute and the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act, which impose a duty on employers
to install safety guards on machines manufactured before the pro-
64. General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Maddox, 372 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (per
curiam).
65. Jackson v. Harsco Corp., 364 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
66. Id. at 809; see FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCT. No. 4.9, 4.11.
67. Clement v. Rousselle Corp., 372 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
68. Under the Florida Worker's Compensation Law, FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1979), an em-
ployer is immune from suit in tort by his employee.
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mulgation of the standards."
In the bizarre case of Angel v. F. Avanzini Lumber Co.,7 0 the
court held a seller liable for negligence, after the buyer's criminal
act caused the death of a third person. A gun dealer had sold a
rifle and ammunition to a woman whose eyes were glazed and who
laughed and giggled as she hugged and kissed one of the dealer's
employees (a total stranger). The woman had repeatedly pointed
the rifle at the head of the dealer's salesman during the course of
the sale and made numerous attempts to load the rifle. The sales-
man then telephoned the sheriff about the woman's strange behav-
ior and was advised that he was not obliged to sell the rifle to her.
He sold her the rifle nonetheless. The woman later shot and killed
a third person; the seller was held liable in negligence to the vic-
tim's estate. The court held that the foreseeable harm to another
from the sale of the firearm and ammunition to a buyer with such
erratic behavior had proximately caused the injury. The seller's lia-
bility was not superseded by the intervening criminal act of the
purchaser.
Finally, in Matthews v. GSP Corp.,, the court insisted on
proof of all the elements of a claim in a products liability suit
against the alleged seller and alleged manufacturer. A cable sup-
porting a scaffold had broken, causing the plaintiff to fall to the
ground. The court held that the plaintiff must prove that the cable
in question was in fact sold or manufactured by the defendants
and that the cable was defective when it left the hands of the seller
or manufacturer.
D. Counterclaims
In Richards Paint Manufacturing Co. v. Onyx Paints, Inc.,72 a
wholesale paint dealer sued one of its customers for $2,458 owed
for paint purchased on an open account. The customer then coun-
terclaimed for breach of express and implied warranties, alleging
that the paint was unfit for use. The wholesaler filed a third party,
complaint for indemnification against the paint manufacturer for
all such paint supplied to the customer and for all paint that the
wholesaler had ever purchased from the manufacturer, a sum ex-
ceeding $10,000. The court held that the third party complaint
69. 372 So. 2d at 1160.
70. 363 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
71. 368 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
72. 363 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
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against the manufacturer had to be limited to the amount of the
customer's claim against the wholesaler, under rule 1.180 of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.7 The court noted that had rule
18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applied, the whole-
saler could have asserted all claims which he might have had




In a suit for indemnity in a products liability action, a court
should withhold summary judgment in favor of the third party de-
fendant "unless no version of the facts could support the indem-
nity claimed." This rule is particularly apt where the active or pas-
sive negligence of the parties is at issue because a jury must
determine that issue of fact.
7 15
Under the general law governing indemnification agreements,
all attorney's fees incurred are part of the indemnitee's damages.
In Brown v. Financial Indemnity Co.,7 6 the court held that attor-
ney's fees were recoverable both in the trial court and on appeal,
even though the contract of indemnity did not expressly provide
for the payment of attorney's fees on appeal. The contract at issue
predated, and the decision was reached independently of, section
59.46(1) of the Florida Statutes, which requires that a statute or
contract providing for payment of attorney's fees be construed to
include attorney's fees for the appeal.
Attorneys for lessors of machinery would be well advised to
study the case of Robstone Co. v. Southern Crane Rentals, Inc.7
The case illustrates that a lengthy provision disclaiming any war-
ranty but failing to mention negligence, along with an indemnity
provision failing to provide expressly that the lessee agrees to in-
demnify the lessor from the lessor's own negligence, have the cu-
mulative effect of not exculpating the lessor from liability for its
own negligence.
73. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180(a) provides in part that a defendant as a third party plaintiff
can serve a complaint on a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him
"for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him .... "
74. 363 So. 2d at 597. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) allows a defendant asserting a third party
complaint to join as many claims as he has against the opposing party. Florida has no coun-
terpart to this provision.
75. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Bayfront Medical Center, 363 So. 2d 1124, 1125 (Fla.
2d DCA 1978).
76. 366 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
77. 366 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
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F. Statute of Limitations
A recent supreme court decision invalidated as unconstitu-
tional a statutory limitation which, when applied, presented an ab-
solute bar to the courts. The decision may profoundly affect prod-
ucts liability law, particularly with respect to health-related
products. Section 95.11(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes78 barred law-
suits brought more than twelve years after the occurrence of events
connected with the construction of improvements to real property.
The court in Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons79 held that the
statute violates the constitutional right of access to the courts
guaranteed by article I, section 21 of the Constitution of the State
of Florida, 80 as applied to a person injured after the expiration of
the twelve-year period."' The majority reasoned that if such a suit
were barred, no access to the courts would ever have existed for
the injured party. Because other provisions of chapter 95 (gov-
erning suits for breach of warranty in the sale of goods) parallel
section 95.11(3)(c), they may be unconstitutional if their applica-
tion would work an absolute bar.
82
Such an extension of Sirmons, however, would overrule deci-
sions barring actions based on prescription drug injuries. For ex-
ample, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that an
action for damages resulting from the cancer-producing qualities of
Stilbetin (also known as DES or diethylstilbestrol), which was filed
twenty-one years after the delivery of the drug, was barred under
section 95.031(2) of the Florida Statutes.s That provision requires
that a products liability action be brought within twelve years after
the date of delivery of the product to the original purchaser, re-
78. (1979). The relevant portion of the statute provides that an action founded on the
design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property must be brought
against the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor within 12 years
after completion of the improvements which produced the injury. In effect, this section de-
stroys a cause of action before it exists.
79. 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
80. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 provides that: "The courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
81. 369 So. 2d at 575.
82. See Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973), in which the constitutional right of
access to the courts was interpreted as precluding the legislature from abolishing a statutory
or common law right of action without providing any reasonable alternative for redress of a
particular injury. The only exception to this is a legislative showing of an overpowering
public necessity for the abolishment of the right, where no alternative method of protecting
public necessity can be found.




gardless of the date the defect was or should have been discovered.
Although the user did not learn of the defect until twenty years
after her first use of the product, and never could have learned of
the defect-much less have filed-within the twelve year period,
the suit was barred.
Similarly, a patient whose eyesight became seriously impaired
after ingestion of a prescribed drug, Tegretol, and who had con-
sulted specialists about the problem, was barred by the running of
the four-year period of limitations from suing the manufacturer of
the drug.8 Under section 95.031(2) of the Florida Statutes, the
statute of limitations in actions for products liability begins run-
ning from the time the "facts giving rise to the cause of action were
discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due
diligence."8 5 Although on first reading the case seems correct, the
court in effect required a lay patient to have a greater knowledge
of "cause and effect" than the numerous medical specialists who
were consulted during the course of treatment. In brief, the patient
must discover something that all the medical specialists missed.
Under the Sirmons access to courts reasoning, however, a prescrip-
tion drug case like this one may have an opposite result.
In Kelley Tractor Co. v. Gurgiolo,86 the court held that the
statute of limitations barred a cause of action against a seller for
breach of an express warranty of the future performance of boat
engines. The buyer continuously experienced significant mechani-
cal difficulties with the engines between the date of purchase in
October 1968 and the time of suit in 1976. During that time, he
had discovered or should have discovered that the defendant had
breached his express warranties of future performance. Although
the decision fails to state anything about the nature of the war-
ranty, it is consistent with original section 2-725 of the U.C.C. (and
repealed Florida Statute § 672.2-725(1)), that the limitations pe-
riod begins to run from the date of delivery "except that where a
warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance
the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered. '87 In this case, the buyer knew or should have known,
because of the chronic breakdowns, that the breach had occurred.
84. Steiner v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 364 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
85. Id. at 51. The four-year period is provided by FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(a), (e) (1979).
86. 369 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (per curiam).
87. FLA. STAT. § 672.2-725 (1973). This section was repealed, effective January 1, 1975,
with the revision of chapter 95 of the Florida Statutes. 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-382, § 26.
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G. Warranties and Negligence in Real Property Sales
The case of Simmons v. Owens"8 gave rise to "products liabil-
ity" issues as applied to the sale of a house instead of to the sale of
goods. In Simmons, the purchaser of a used house sued the original
contractor for negligence in failing to follow a city building code by
placing the wood siding of the house less than six inches from the
ground. Placed so low, the wood was damaged by water rot and
termite infestation. The second owner alleged that this was a la-
tent defect not discoverable by reasonable inspection. The court
held that even though the plaintiff was not the initial buyer from
the builder, a cause of action was stated in negligence.8 9 The Sim-
mons court did not address implied warranty theory under the
Code, which had already been held applicable in cases between the
immediate buyer and his builder.' 0
The Florida Legislature recently limited the availability of
statutorily implied warranties of fitness and merchantability to
buyers of condominiums for which construction began after the
Florida U.C.C. became effective.' 1 Any buyer, however, retains a
cause of action for breach of a warranty implied in common law,
and is entitled to permission to amend his complaint to set forth
this alternative theory.'2
H. Legislation
Although in general the Florida Legislature has accepted the
1972 official text of the U.C.C., the legislature recently enacted va-
rious laws affecting commercial relations both within and without
the Code. Most of the changes appear in article 9 (discussed in the
section on security agreements in this article), but some changes
have been made in articles 1 and 2. For example, a 1979 amend-
ment changes the implied warranty sections" to provide that a
Florida seller of hogs or cattle will not be deemed to give an im-
88. 363 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); see Luciani v. High, 372 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 4th'
DCA 1979), which held that an engineer employed by a general contractor to perform the
necessary testing and examination of land upon which a residence was to be built, would be
liable to third persons who might foreseeably be injured as a result of the negligent perform-
ance of his contractual duties. Thus, the engineer would be liable to the owner of the resi-
dence, as the owner was within the zone of foreseeability.
89. 363 So. 2d at 144.
90. See Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972) (condominiums).
91. FLA. STAT. § 718.203 (Supp. 1978), as amended by 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-314, § 9.
The effective date of the statute was July 1, 1974.
92..Greenburg v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
93. U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to -318 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 672.314 to .318 (1979)).
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plied warranty that the animals are free from sickness or disease.
The exemption does not apply if the seller knowingly sells diseased
animals.9"
The recent amendments adopt many of the 1972 recom-
mended Code revisions. An amendment to section 671.201(9) of
the Florida Statutes"5 deems certain persons who buy from sellers
of minerals (including oil and gas) at the wellhead or mine head to
be buyers in the ordinary course of business. To qualify, one must
buy in ordinary course, in good faith, and without knowledge that
the sale violates the ownership rights or security interest of a third
party in the goods."
A further revision adopted last session in Florida makes a con-
tract for the sale of growing timber a contract for the sale of goods,
regardless of whether the buyer or the seller is to cut the timber.
Notwithstanding this change in the Code, the sponsors point out
that to protect people dealing with timberlands, financing state-
ments must be filed in the county in which the land is located, in
the same manner as for the sale of fixture property.98
A third adoption of recommended revisions to the Code fol-
lowed the 1966 recommendations. The legislature amended section
672.702(3) of the Florida Statutes to protect a seller's right to re-
claim goods against being cut off by a lien creditor or a trustee in
bankruptcy."a
Outside the Code, the legislature manifested some semantic
magic in a recent amendment to the laws on motor vehicle title
certificates.100 Now, "when a [motor] vehicle is registered in the
names of two or more persons as co-owners in the alternative by
the use of the word 'or,' such vehicle shall be held in joint ten-
94. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-141 (adding paragraph (d) to FLA. STAT. § 672.316 (1979)).
95. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398, § 2.
96. Id. The "buying" may be for cash or exchange of other property, and on either
secured or unsecured credit; it cannot include a transfer in bulk or be considered security
for, or in total or partial satisfaction of, a money debt.
97. Id. § 3 (amending FLA. STAT. § 672.107 (1977)).
98. Id. Sponsor's notes. The purpose of the change was to facilitate the financing of
these transactions by treating the timber as goods instead of real estate.
99. Id. § 4 (amending FLA. STAT. § 672.702(3) (1977)). The statute as amended provides:
"the seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordi-
nary course or other good faith purchaser under this chapter (s. 672.403). Successful recla-
mation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to them." The phrase "or lien
creditor" following "purchaser" was deleted.
100. Id. ch. 79-333 (amending FLA. STAT. § 319.22(2) (1977)). The effective date of the
amendment was January 1, 1980.
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ancy." ' 1 In accordance with this startling theory of property law,
each co-owner is deemed to have granted the other the absolute
right to dispose of title in the vehicle, with the signature of any co-
owner constituting proper indorsement. Upon the death of a co-
owner, the decedent's interest passes to the survivor as though title
were held in joint tenancy. This provision is applicable "even if the
co-owners are husband and wife, '"102 so it appears that a tenancy
by the entirety has now become a joint tenancy, at least for motor
vehicle ownership purposes. In a more logical move, the legislature
provided that when the vehicle is registered in the names of two or
more owners connected by the conjunction "and," the signatures of
all owners are required for a transfer of title. 08
Under a recent addition to the pawnbroker statute,' any per-
son who sells or pledges goods to a pawnbroker must present a
driver's license or other comparable identification to the pawn-
broker. The pawnbroker is then required to record the date of the
transaction, the type of identification presented, and the identify-
ing number appearing thereon. This record must be signed by the
person from whom the pawnbroker receives the property. 105 In ad-
dition, any lawful owner who discovers his stolen goods in the
hands of a pawnbroker may recover them simply by informing any
law enforcement agency of the location of the goods and providing
proof of ownership. The agency is then authorized to recover the
goods from the pawnbroker without expense to the owner. The
pawnbroker will be able to defeat this right of recovery if he can
present evidence that he received proof of ownership by the person
who sold or pledged the goods to him.' There is a frontier-like.
quality to this extrajudicial quasi-replevin approach to the recov-
ery of stolen goods, which raises questions about its sufficiency for
due process.
IV. CARRIERS
In a case of first impression in Florida,10 7 the supreme court,
held that cargo trailers and containers with temporarily affixed
101. FLA. STAT. § 319.22(2)(a)(1) (1979).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 319.22(2)(a)(2).
104. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-249 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 715.041 (1979)).
105. FLA. STAT. § 715.041(1) (1979).
106, Id. § 715.041(2).
107. Tropical Shipping & Constr. Co. v. Askew, 364 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1978) (construing
FLA. STAT. § 212.08(a) (1973)).
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wheels that are later boarded on ships for foreign commerce will
receive the same partial tax exemption as vehicles used in inter-
state and foreign commerce. Under the Florida Use and Sales Tax
Statutes,10 8 therefore, owners of these trailers and containers will
pay the percentage of the sales and use tax which represents "the
number of miles traveled by the containers and trailers in Florida
[divided by] the total miles traveled including the miles traveled
'fishy-back'" (i.e. while the trailers and containers are on board a
vessel).' 0'
A motor carrier transporting goods in Florida without authori-
zation by the Florida Public Service Commission may be subject to
an injunction at the request of an authorized rival carrier under
chapter 323 of the Florida Statutes. Even though this chapter is
silent about an aggrieved carrier's right to damages, money dam-
ages may be awarded under the common law theory that one who
is injured by a competitor's engagement in business in violation of
a statute has a cause of action for the resulting damages." 0
Unrelated to regulatory statutes, a decision by the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the existence of an
agency relationship between freight forwarders was a question of
fact for a jury to determine, where a Miami forwarder referred a
shipper's problem to a Baltimore forwarder whose negligence in
preparing the bill of lading caused loss to the shipper. Conse-
quently, the trial court committed reversible error in charging the
jury that the Miami forwarder would be liable as a matter of law
for the negligence of the Baltimore forwarder.''
V. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. Agency
Under section 673.403 of the Florida Statutes, a court may ad-
mit parol evidence to determine the capacity in which corporate
representatives have signed a note which contains the company
name but does not specify the representatives' capacity. In Placet,
Inc. v. Ashton," 2 a note was signed thus:
108. FLA. STAT. §§ 212.01-.22 (1979).
109. 364 So. 2d at 437.
110. Smalley Transp. Co. v. Moed's Transfer Co., 373 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
111. Latin Am. Shipping Co. v. Pan Am. Trading Corp., 363 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978).
112. 368 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). FLA. STAT. § 673.403(2) (1979) provides
that "[an authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument. . . [elxcept
as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the instru-
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Placet, Inc.-Ray Esser
Richard Jensen.
The court upheld the trial court's finding based on parol testimony
that the signers were personally liable.
B. Defenses
As a general rule, the legal inception or valid existence of a
negotiable instrument depends- upon its delivery in accordance
with the purpose and intention of the parties."' Thus, when the
drawer of a check made payable to a payee never delivers the
check, but deposits it in the drawer's, own account, the named
payee acquires no rights in the unissued check and has no cause of
action for conversion against the bank under section 673.419(1)(c)
of the Florida Statutes.
1 1 4
Judicial relief will also be denied a payee seeking to enforce a
note from a maker with whom the payee was in pari delicto in a
fraud scheme. In Whitelock v. Geiger,115 the payee, while acting in
a fiduciary capacity as to the maker, devised a scheme with the
maker to defraud creditors in bankruptcy proceedings concerning
the maker's business. The court refused to help the parties settle
their dispute.
A bank successfully raised a defense based on section 673.117
of the Florida Statutes, against a conversion claim by the pur-
chaser of a cashier's check.116 Plaintiff had purchased a cashier's
check made payable to "The Shores Corporation of Miami Escrow
Acct. for Unit 401 D Bldg. 'C' B/O Pablo Goldszmidt," and the
drawee bank had paid the check when endorsed "For deposit only,
The Shores Corp. of Miami 009-726-6." The District Court of Ap-
peal, Fourth District, held that the endorsement was valid and
payment of the check was proper under the section of the statute
which provides, in effect, that as long as the check was endorsed by
the Shores Corporation, then the additional language describing
the purpose for the issuance of the check was to be treated as sur-
plusage. The bank would be liable to the customer in conversion
only if it knew that the payee was making improper use of the
ment names the person represented but does not show that the representative signed in a
representative capacity . .. ."
113. City Nat'l Bank v. Wernick, 368 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
114. Id. at 937. FLA. STAT. § 673.419(1)(c) (1979). The statute provides that an instru-
ment is converted when it is paid on a forged endorsement.
115. 368 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (per curiam).
116. Pan Am. Bank v. Goldszmidt, 364 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
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check."' The same result would obtain if a personal rather than a
cashier's check was used.
Section 673.305 of the Florida Statutes defeats the defense of
discharge of payment in favor of a holder in due course. If a holder
in due course has no notice that the maker of negotiable promis-
sory notes has paid the original payee prior to the negotiation of
the notes by the payee to the holder in due course, he takes the
instruments free of the defense of discharge of payment. 18 The
general rule, now incorporated into the above statute, is that a
holder in due course takes and holds negotiable instruments free of
all defenses of which he is not on notice. A maker may avoid suit
on a discharged note by simply demanding the return of the note
at the time of payment.
Two procedural issues were decided regarding defenses on ne-
gotiable instruments. In an action on a note a debtor raised affirm-
ative defenses that the lender had (1) fraudulently agreed to con-
solidate the note with another note and (2) failed to consolidate
the notes. The court struck these defenses because they did not
refer to the maker's obligation on the note. 1 In a second case, a
plaintiff holder of a promissory note who failed to reply to affirma-
tive defenses was not deemed to have admitted them when the
plaintiff's evidence did not attempt to avoid the affirmative de-
fenses but instead denied them.120
Finally, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, has re-
fused to read a promissory note "in an unnatural and unusual
manner" to sustain a guarantor's assertion that the note was usuri-
ous. The court upheld a summary judgment against the defen-
dants, who failed to assert any particularized defense of usury.2
C. Forgery
Some recent Florida decisions regarding instrument forgery
are troubling because of procedural or substantive deficiencies.
One court decided a complex forgery case even though plaintiff ap-
parently had no standing to sue. In Barnett Bank v. Lipp, 1 22 the
117. Id. at 507. For a case with substantially similar facts and holding, see Pan Am.
Bank v. Yanco, 364 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
118. Bank of Miami v. Florida City Express, 367 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
119. American Arlington Bank v. Cohen, 369 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
120. Treister v. Capital Bank. 369 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (per curiam).
121. Southern Shipping Co. v. Flagship First Nat'l Bank, 366 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 3d DCA
1979) (per curiam).
122. 364 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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plaintiff was a customer of a stockbroker who, at the request of a
dishonest employee, drew a check payable to the customer. The
employee then forged the endorsement of the customer and cashed
the check at his own bank; the customer's account with the stock-
broker was debited for the amount of the check. The customer-
payee then sued the cashing bank, which unsuccessfully asserted
the so-called "fictitious payee" rule. That rule, under section
673.405(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes, did not apply to actions be-
tween a payee and a collecting bank, but was limited to actions
between the drawer of a check and the drawee bank.1" The cash-
ing bank would be liable to the payee for conversion under section
673.419(3) of the Florida Statutes, unless the bank showed that it
acted in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards in the cashing of the check. 124 The bank failed to present
any evidence on the standards of the banking trade. The appellate
court, agreeing with the trial court jury that the bank was negli-
gent in cashing the check, based its decision in part upon the bank
cashier's failure to obtain the initials of a bank officer prior to
cashing the check, despite the large amount of the check ($7,000)
and the length of time since issuance (one month).2 The troubling
thing about this decision is that because the check was never is-
sued to the payee, he had no property right in the check and thus
had no standing to sue. 2 Yet the court did not address the issue
of standing.
In O.K. Moving & Storage Co. v. Eglin National Bank,127 an
inadequate analysis of the facts and law led to the right result for
the wrong reasons. For over thirteen months, an employee depos-
ited checks made payable to her employer, O.K. Moving, in her
private account at the Eglin National Bank. Each check was sub-
ject to a restrictive endorsement which read, "For Deposit Only,
O.K. Moving & Storage Company, Inc., 80 Carson Drive, N.E.,
Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32548." O.K. Moving had no account
or business relationship with the bank, and after discovering the
transactions, it sued the bank. The trial court granted only partial
123. Id. at 29. The statute provides that an endorsement by any person in the name of
a named payee is effective if an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him
with the name of the payee, intending the latter to have no such interest. FLA. STAT. §
673.405(1)(c) (1979).
124. 364 So. 2d at 29.
125. Id. at 30.
126. E.g., Winn v. First State Bank, 581 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. 1979); see note 113 and accom-
panying text supra.
127. 363 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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recovery, holding that although the bank was negligent, the em-
ployer was also negligent in not discovering the embezzlement for
such a long period of time. On appeal, the court held that since the
employer had committed no act inducing the bank to accept the
deposit of these checks, it had committed no negligence "that
proximately caused the bank to conduct its operation as it did.
' 128
The court then inexplicably cited authority for the proposition
that when a depositary bank collects on checks bearing the forged
signature of the payee, it would be liable in conversion to the
payee-employer.1 29 Actually, if these signatures truly had been for-
geries, then under section 673.419(3) of the Florida Statutes, the
bank would not be liable, except for the check proceeds still re-
maining in its hands. 80 These signatures, however, were not for-
geries; they were genuine. The Eglin Bank was liable not because it
paid on forged signatures, but because it ignored restrictive en-
dorsements. In this latter case, a bank is liable for the full proceeds
of the checks and not just the proceeds still remaining in its hands,
under sections 673.206(3) and 673.603(1)(b) of the Florida Stat-
utes."'1 The final decision by the court in O.K. Moving in favor of
the payee is correct, but the faulty analysis may well mislead other
courts.
In another action, involving a true forgery, a payee who knew
that checks on her account had been paid upon a forged endorse-
ment by a business associate waited several months before pursu-
ing the bank for conversion of the checks and was deemed to have
ratified the forgery under section 673.404 of the Florida Stat-
utes. 3 2 As a result, the payee had no cause of action against the
bank and could proceed only against her former associate.'
A person who wrongfully signs the drawer's name to a check,
then signs the payee's name, and adds an endorsement of a ficti-
tious person to the check may be guilty of criminal forgery even
though the last name signed was fictitious. Proving guilt of forgery
128. Id. at 162.
129. Id.
130. See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
131. FLA. STAT. § 673.603(1)(b) (1979) provides in part that liability is not discharged to
the extent of payment when a party pays or satisfies the holder of an instrument, which has
been restrictively endorsed, in a manner not consistent with the terms of the restrictive
endorsement.
132. Fulka v. Florida Commercial Banks, Inc., 371 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The
statute provides that an unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative unless the person
whose name is signed ratifies it or is precluded from denying it. FLA. STAT. § 673.404 (1979).
133. 371 So. 2d at 525.
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requires a showing that the assumed name was used with intent to
defraud.134
D. Statute of Limitations
The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the constitutionality of
sections 95.022 and 95.11(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes, which re-
duce the statute of limitations from twenty to five years for a suit
on a contract (a promissory note) under seal. The court noted that
these sections provide for a savings clause that permits suits by
persons having an existing cause of action under a sealed instru-
ment one year from the date of the act. This allows such a reasona-
ble time that the retroactive application of the statute falls within
constitutionally permissible limits and does not violate the consti-
tutional prohibition against impairment of contractual obli-
gations.13
E. Legislation
A recent enactment increases from five dollars to ten dollars
the maximum amount a payee may collect as a service charge on a
worthless check.'s' Further, a payee who prevails in an action is
now entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs of col-
lection. The legislature failed, however, to amend the required
form of the notice to the check issuer, which still provides for a
five dollar service charge.
1 37
F. Letters of Credit
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, recently held
that strict conformity with the terms of a letter of credit is neces-
sary before payment will be required. In Fidelity National Bank v.
Dade County,'3 8 the bank issued a letter of credit to the county to
secure a customer's performance. The letter provided that the
bank would pay the county upon receipt of the county's draft for
the correct sum, accompanied by a certificate of the Director of
Public Works stating that the customer had failed to complete the
specified improvements. On the letter's expiration date, the county
tendered its draft, a memorandum from the Director of Public
134. Davis v. State, 364 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
135. Carpenter v. Florida Cent. Credit Union, 369 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 1979).
136. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-345 (amending FLA. STAT. § 832.07(1)(a)-(2) (1977)).
137. FLA. STAT. § 832.07(1)(a) (1979).
138. 371 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
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Works directing the Finance Director to collect on the letter of
credit, and a letter-not a certificate-to the bank, signed by the
chief accountant and stating that the customer had failed to per-
form. The bank refused to pay the draft, on the ground that the
terms of the letter of credit had not been complied with. The court
agreed with the bank and reversed the circuit court's judgment for
the county.
VI. SURETIES AND GUARANTORS
A. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
Florida's long-arm statutes 39 are not to be given a retroactive
application, according to the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict. As a result, the statute extending long-arm jurisdiction could
not help guarantors perfect long-arm jurisdiction over debtors in a
suit for payment, when the guarantors had paid the promissory
note prior to the time that the statute became effective. The cause
of action of the guarantor accrued at the time it paid its obligation
on the debt, at which time the statutes were yet unavailable to
confer jurisdiction over the nonresident makers.1
4 0
Under section 48.181 of the Florida Statutes, however, a for-
eign corporation which guaranteed three promissory notes by exe-
cuting the guarantee in Florida was held to be doing business in
Florida. The corporation was found to have had sufficient mini-
mum contacts with the state to satisfy due process standards and
confer personal jurisdiction."
In a case involving a promissory note and guarantee agreement
made in Illinois, the payee suing on the note in Florida did not
need to allege and prove the law of Illinois in order to recover.
Either party to litigation may plead and prove the law that is ap-
plicable to the contract in question; if there is a failure to plead
any applicable foreign law, the court will presume that the foreign
law is the same as Florida law.
142
B. Defenses
As of May 1979, all of the district courts of Florida agreed that
a secured party must give its debtor notice before disposing of col-
139. FLA. STAT. §§ 48.193, .194 (1979); see notes 2 & 5 supra.
140. Connell v. Ott Research & Dev. Inc., 363 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
141. Compania Anonima Simantob v. Bank of America Int'l, 373 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1979); see note 10 supra.
142. Watson v. First Nat'l Bank, 367 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
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lateral or else forfeit the right to a deficiency judgment. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, First District, held that where a promissory
note expressly provides that it is governed by the U.C.C. and that
the lender will give the borrower reasonable notice of the time and
place of any public or private sale, the failure to give the requisite
notice prior to the sale or disposition of the collateral precludes an
action for a deficiency judgment against the debtors.""3 In so hold-
ing, the court reaffirmed an earlier decision in which it aligned it-
self with the view of the Second, Third, and Fourth Districts, that
a violation of the provisions of subsections 9-504(2) and (3) of the
U.C.C.1" precludes the lender from obtaining a deficiency judg-
ment against the guarantors upon foreclosure of the note.'
4 5
A continuing guarantee agreement is one which by its lan-
guage contemplates a course of dealing in the future, a series of
transactions in the future, or a continuing line of credit to the
principal debtor. '6 Under this kind of guarantee, the lender need
not give the guarantor notice of each extension of credit to the
principal debtor, provided that the particular transactions fall
within the description of the course of dealings contemplated by
the terms of the guarantee. It is also not necessary that the lender
inform the guarantor of a change in interest rates for the various
extensions of credit. If the continuing guarantee agreement ex-
pressly provides that the lender need not give the guarantor notice,
that is a further reason for dispensing with any necessity of giving
notice.'
47
In Frank v. Intercontinental Bank," 8 an attorney issued his
promissory note to a bank in exchange for a note previously given
to the bank by the attorney's client, and the bank sued the attor-
ney on his note. Under section 3-408 of the U.C.C.," 9 the defense
of lack of consideration was unavailing. Further, since the attorney
had given a renewal note in place of his original note, neither the
defense of a lack of consideration for the original note, nor the de-
143. Southeast First Nat'l Bank v. LeGrace Co., 363 So. 2d 128, 129 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978).
144. FLA. STAT. § 679.504(2)-(3) (1979).
145. 363 So. 2d at 129 (citing Barnett v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 345 So. 2d 804
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977)).
146. Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Melo, 366 So. 2d 1218, 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
147. Id.
148. 372 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (per curiam).
149. FLA. STAT. § 673.408 (1979) provides in part: "Want or failure of consideration is a
defense as against any person not having the rights of a holder in due course, . . . except
that no consideration is necessary for an instrument or obligation thereon given in payment
of or as security for an antecedent obligation of any kind."
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fense that the attorney issued the note as an accommodation party
for the benefit of the bank (rather than the client) could prevail.
A novation contract, like most other contracts, must be sup-
ported by consideration. The mere showing that a guarantor
agreed to make installment payments on a debt which his guaran-
tee already obligated him to pay lacks the requisite consideration
for a novation. In addition, without evidence that the creditor in-
tended to cancel the original debt or cancelled the promissory
note, there is no showing of a novation." 10
In Jones v. W.L. Cobb Construction Co.,' 5' the stockholders of
a general contracting corporation gave this guarantee to landown-
ers: "We unconditionally guarantee to [the owner] the due per-
formance of all [the general contractor's] obligations under the
above described construction contract.""' In a subcontractor's suit
against the stockholders to foreclose a mechanic's lien, the court
held that the stockholders were guarantors of a performance obli-
gation, not a payment obligation. The guarantee thus did not inure
to the benefit of mechanics' lien claimants; the guarantee extended
no further than the promise solely to the landowners that the con-
tract would be performed. "0 8
Under subsections 3-606(1) and (2) of the U.C.C.,54 a holder
of a promissory note may enter into a stipulation with some of the
sureties on the note to dismiss them with prejudice as parties to a
suit. At the same time, the holder may reserve his rights (including
rights of contribution) against the remaining sureties, notwith-
standing the agreement. This stipulation is actually a covenant not
to sue, rather than a release; a release would have the effect of
releasing all sureties. 15
C. Impairment of Collateral
In Baitcher v. National Industrial Bank,155 a bank lender who
had assured the guarantor of a loan that the lender would perfect a
security interest in the goods securing the loan failed to do so.
150. Miami Nat'l Bank v. Forecast Constr. Corp., 366 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
(per curiam).
151. 371 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
152. Id. at 551.
153. Id. at 552.
154. FLA. STAT. § 673.606(1)-(2) (1979).
155. Brunswick Corp. v. Concorde Yachts, Inc., 370 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
156. 368 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). See also U.C.C. § 3-606 (FLA. STAT. § 673.606
(1979)).
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Consequently, the collateral was lost to the trustee in bankruptcy.
The court held that the failure to perfect released the guarantor to
the extent that he was harmed by the loss of the collateral, al-
though the court failed to cite section 9-207 of the U.C.C. (section
679.207 of the Florida Statutes) which controlled the case.
In another case, a wife acted as a guarantor in signing her hus-
band's promissory note in return for the lender's making a loan to
the husband. The court held that the wife's promise was supported
by consideration and was binding on her. 5 7 In addition, since the
guarantee agreement allowed the lender to impair collateral and
provided that any impairment would not constitute a defense to
the guarantor, the wife had contractually surrendered the defense
of impairment of collateral.
In Aetna Insurance Co. v. Buchanan, 58 a surety bond was is-
sued in consideration of an individual's agreeing to indemnify the
surety company in the event of loss for a period of one year. The
surety bond provided that either the surety company or the princi-
pal could terminate before the expiration of the one-year period.
The indemnity agreement, however, had no provision allowing the
indemnitor to terminate his obligation, and the court held that the
indemnitor could not unilaterally terminate before the expiration
of the one-year period. The terms of the surety bond could not be
engrafted into the indemnity agreement.
VII. MORTGAGES
A. Balloon Mortgages
Strictly construing the Florida Statute on balloon mortgages, a
district court held that when a balloon mortgage did not contain
the final amount due upon maturity in accordance with the word-
ing of section 697.05 of the Florida Statutes, the mortgagee for-
feited interest, costs, and attorney's fees.159 In addition, the matur-
ity date was extended from three years to nine years, even though
the mortgage was conspicuously labeled as a balloon mortgage and
the boldface type followed most of the language of the statute.
In a multifaceted decision, the District Court of Appeal, First
District, held that the assignee of a balloon note and mortgage was
157. von Dunser v. Southeast First Nat'l Bank, 367 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
158. 369 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
159. Overlock v. Marshall, 363 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (per curiam). A dissent-
ing judge would have reversed the trial judge's ruling on the grounds that the mortgage
substantially complied with the statute.
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subject to the provisions of the balloon mortgage statute.'10 Be-
cause the assigned balloon mortgage violated the statute, the as-
signee had to forfeit the interest it had received. The forfeiture was
limited, however; the present mortgagor could not recover interest
paid by a predecessor in title.
B. Construction Loans
A construction lender reserving the right in a mortgage agree-
ment to enter and complete a project if the mortgagor stops con-
struction should give serious attention to the case of Gross v. City
of Riviera Beach.1 ' In Gross, a construction loan agreement pro-
vided that if construction ceased for ten days or if the owner aban-
doned the property, the mortgagee had the right to enter and com-
plete the project. The mortgagor defaulted and ceased construction
after completing ninety percent of the work. The lender foreclosed
but did not take over possession and did not continue construc-
tion. The city building permit expired by operation of law ninety
days after construction ceased, but before the expiration of that
permit the city substantially reduced the density permitted in the
area. After acquiring the property in the foreclosure sale, the
lender sought a new building permit to complete the project at its
original density. The city refused to grant a variance and a new
building permit; the trial and appellate courts agreed. Because the
lender had failed to exercise its right under the mortgage to step in
promptly and complete the project, the lender's own failure to act
had caused the loss.162
In a similar case, a construction lender had continued to ad-
vance funds to a borrower despite the improbability that the bor-
rower would complete construction by the date set in the loan
agreement. The court held that the lender had thereby waived his
right to declare a default. The court reasoned that the borrower
had critically changed its position by giving up its opportunity to
complete the building on time, in reliance upon the lender's ad-
vances. This waiver was binding on the lender without the bor-
160. O'Neil v. Lorain Nat'l Bank, 369 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (per curiam). The
relevant portion of the statute provides: "Any mortgagee, creditor, . . . assignee, transferee
... violating the provisions of this section shall forfeit the entire interest charged . . . , and
only the principal sum of such mortgage can be enforced in any court in this state ......
FLA. STAT. § 697.05(4) (1979) (emphasis supplied).
161. 367 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
162. Id. at 651.
19801
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
rower's paying any consideration."'8
C. Defenses
Among the defenses recently asserted in mortgage foreclosure
actions are: fraud in the making or assigning of a mortgage, oral
modification of the agreement, release, laches, nondelivery of a
completion certificate as required by statute, and the superior
rights of an intervening estate or innocent third party.
An assignor-mortgagee's use of fraud to obtain a note and
mortgage constitutes an adequate defense by the mortgagor
against a foreclosing assignee that does not hold in due course. In
Second National Bank v. G.M.T. Properties, Inc., 64 the bank
which received the mortgage assignment without the endorsement
of the note could not be a holder 1 65 and hence could not be a
holder in due course. 166 The bank's failure to inform the mortgagor
of the assignment until payment of interest was due contributed to
the decision against the bank.
In another instance, the defense of fraud did not suffice to
prevent foreclosure without a showing that the mortgagee was in-
volved in or had any knowledge of the alleged fraud. 167 The only
,parties alleged to have been involved in the fraud were third party
defendants, whom the third party plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed.
If supported by consideration, an oral modification of a note
and mortgage that extends the time for payment is a valid defense
to foreclosure of the mortgage. Similarly, a lack of consideration in
making the mortgage is a valid defense to a foreclosure action.
These defenses are not mere "paper issues," and summary judg-
ment should not be granted in favor of a lender making no effort to
disprove them.16
163. Flagler Center Bldg. Loan Corp. v. Chemical Realty Corp., 363 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1978) (per curiam).
164. 364 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
165. FLA. STAT. § 671.201(20) (1979).
166. FLA. STAT. § 673.202 (1979).
167. Baron v. Estate of Clare, 372 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
168. Howdeshell v. First Nat'l Bank, 369 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The author
questions whether the court meant waiver when it used the word "modification." A waiver
would have eliminated the time requirement for payment. A modification would have ex-
tended the time requirement. See Kerber v. Chadan, Inc., 364 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA
1978), which reversed the entry of a summary judgment in favor of mortgagors on their
defense that the mortgagees were equitably estopped to foreclose because one of them had
granted an extension of time; the alleged extension was denied and the court held that a
trial was needed to resolve the factual questions.
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In Ratner v. Miami Beach First National Bank,'69 the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, applied the defense of release to
prevent foreclosure on a parcel of land. The rule is that when land
is subject to a mortgage, and the mortgagor sells a portion of the
land, the remaining unsold land becomes the primary source for
the payment of the mortgage. The mortgagee's release of any un-
sold portion from the mortgage discharges the mortgage lien to the
extent of the value of the land released, provided two conditions
are met: (1) the mortgagee knows of the purchaser's rights but re-
leases the remainder without the purchaser's assent and (2) the
part released is sufficient to satisfy the entire debt.
70
In a foreclosure action by the imortgagees against the successor
in interest to the purchaser of two-thirds of the mortgaged parcel,
the court applied the rule to deny foreclosure. First, the court
charged the mortgagee with knowledge of the purchase because the
buyer's deed was recorded nine years before the release. Second,
"the value of the part released . ..was more than sufficient to
satisfy the amount of the original debt."' 7' As Judge Schwartz
pointed out in dissent, the majority decision overlooked the fact
that over $60,000 in interest was due on the mortgage, while the
value of the released land would suffice to pay only the original
balance of the mortgage.
17 2
An independent basis for the majority decision in Ratner was
that even though the statute of limitations had not run, the mort-
gagee would be barred from foreclosing under the theory of laches.
Judge Schwartz again dissented on the ground that there was no
showing that the aggrieved party had relied to its detriment upon
the mortgagees' delay in asserting their rights.7
Under section 520.81(1) of the Florida Statutes,' 74 a contractor
who received a mortgage from a customer under a home improve-
ment contract and who failed to obtain a completion certificate
from the customer as required by the statute had no right to fore-
close the mortgage.
17 5
In a suit by a second mortgagee against the mortgagor, the
169. 368 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
170. Ellis v. Fairbanks, 38 Fla. 257, 21 So. 107 (1897).
171. 368 So. 2d at 1328 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. The Home Improvement Sales and Finance Act, FLA. STAT. § 520.81(1) (1979). The
statute requires that on completion of the home improvements, the contractor shall prepare
a certificate which both parties will sign.
175. Gissendaner v. Rich, 365 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (per curiam).
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mortgagor may not implead the first mortgagee under rule 1.180 of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule precludes a claim
against a third party defendant who could not be liable for all or
part of the original claim. In Sapp Brothers Construction Co. v.
Home Loan Federal Savings and Loan Association,1 76 the defen-
dant mortgagor tried to implead the first mortgagee on the
grounds that it had interfered with the mortgagor's relationship
with the second mortgagee, causing the failure to pay the second
mortgagee. The court correctly dismissed the third party action;
the first mortgagee was neither a proper nor a necessary party to
the action because the first mortgagee could not be liable to the
second mortgagee for payment of the second mortgage. To pursue
a claim against the first mortgagee, the mortgagor would have to
bring a separate action.
In Lonergan v. Lippman,17 the rights of an innocent third
party in an intervening estate defeated a summary judgment mo-
tion for foreclosure based on the merger doctrine. In Lonergan, a
long-term lessee had subleased part of the premises; the sublease
had provided that the sublessee had the option to renew his lease
for a twenty-five year period if the lessee also chose to renew its
lease for at least twenty-five years. The lessee chose to renew its
lease for a fifty-year period, but later sold its leasehold to a com-
pany which purchased the fee simple on the same day. The sellers
conveyed their fee to the company, which gave back a purchase
money mortgage for the express purpose of merging the lease into
the fee. The sublessee continued to occupy the property, made his
rental payments, and soon elected to renew the lease. The com-
pany that had purchased the fee defaulted on its mortgage; fore-
closure was sought against the company and the sublessee. Holding
that the merger of the base lease and the fee had wiped out the
sublessee's interest, the lower court entered summary judgment
against the sublessee. The district court reversed, holding that the
doctrine of merger would not, as a matter of law, apply automati-
cally to deprive the sublessee of his vested right to renew. The
district court noted that if the mortgagees conveyed the fee and
took back the note and mortgage without notice of the sublessee's
rights, then the trial court, upon remand, might apply the merger
doctrine and allow foreclosure. The court noted, however, that the
recorded conveyance of the leasehold estate did recite the fact of
176. 367 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
177. 365 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (per curiam).
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the sublessee's interest and that the sublessee's actual occupancy
of the premises served to give the mortgagees notice of the subles-
see's interest in the property.
1 78
D. Documentary Stamp Taxes
In a case apparently of first impression in Florida, the District
Court of Appeal, First District, held that under section 199.032(2)
of the Florida Statutes, intangible taxes must be paid upon notes
which are, secured by mortgages on leaseholds, because such lease-
holds are interests in real property.1 7 9 In addition, even though the
recording clerk does not require the intangible tax to be paid at
the time the mortgage is recorded, the Department of Revenue
may claim the tax three years after the filing. The mortgagee's al-
leged reliance on two opinions of the Attorney General and an
opinion of the Department of Revenue that an intangible tax was
not due, resulting in the mortgagee's failure to charge the mortga-
gor the amount of the tax, did not estop the Department from
claiming the tax. The court would not consider the alleged custom
in Florida that lenders charge borrowers for the intangible tax, be-
cause the bank failed to prove the existence of such a custom.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that when
partners conveyed real estate subject to a mortgage to a general
partnership, there was a shifting of an 'economic burden, and thus
sufficient consideration under Florida law to warrant the payment
of the documentary stamp tax and surtax by the partnership.1 80
The court also held, however, that the Department of Revenue
should not apply section 12A-4.13(10)(c) of the Florida Adminis-
trative Code strictly in determining the amount of tax liability be-
cause "[i]f one partner's transfer reduces his actual liability then
the consideration for this transfer is proportionately increased.
When another partner's actual liability is increased as a result of
the transfer the consideration for that transfer is proportionately
reduced."1 81 Finally, the court held that the Department of Reve-
nue had no discretion in assessing a penalty for nonpayment and
could not reduce the statutory amount.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in affirming a decision of a dis-
trict court, has held that because the Florida Bar is an arm of the
178. Id. at 421.
179. First Nat'I Bank v. Department of Revenue, 364 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
180. Andean Inv. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 370 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
181. Id. at 379.
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judiciary, it is unconstitutional to impose a documentary stamp tax
on a promissory note issued by the Florida Bar to a lending
bank."'s Chief Justice England, in dissent, noted that the tax is
imposed not upon the borrower (the Florida Bar) but upon the
lender. He argued that the borrower's agreement to bear the
financial burden of the tax is legally irrelevant. To require the De-
partment of Revenue to look beyond the legal incidence of the tax,
he asserted, would be "absurd" and "probably unlawful.
'" 188
E. Usury
In a case of first impression, the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that under section 687.03(3) of the Florida
Statutes, 8 " variable interest charges are not to be spread over the
term of the loan in order to determine the interest rate. The
spreading of "any payment or property charged, reserved, or taken
as an advance or forbearance . . . over the stated term of the loan
for the purpose of determining the rate of interest," refers only to
the spreading of an advance or forbearance. 8 ' A 1974 loan with a
variable interest rate of 4.5% over the prime rate (equivalent to
15% per annum) was not controlled by the 1973 version of section
687.03,186 under which the loan would have been usurious. The
court interpreted the loan under the 1977 version of the statute,' 87
in which the express legislative intent was not to allow for variable
interest charges to be spread over the stated term of the loan. 8
The court noted that remedies provided by a usury statute created
no vested rights, but only an enforceable penalty. This penalty, not
immune from repeal or modification by the enactment of legisla-
tion, could therefore be abated even during the pending of an ap-
peal based on a prior statutory penalty.18 9 Although the current
version of section 687.03 of the Florida Statutes specifically pro-
vides against its retrospective application, the language of section
687.03 in the 1973 and 1975 versions'9" of the Florida Statutes is so
similar to the current version that any of the versions would call
182. Lewis v. Florida Bar, 372 So. 2d 1121, 1122 (Fla. 1979) (per curiam).
183. Id. at 1123 (England, C.J., dissenting).
184. FLA. STAT. § 687.03(3) (1979).
185. Sailboat Apt. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 363 So. 2d 564, 568 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978).
186. FLA. STAT. § 687.03(1) (1973) (amended 1977).
187. Id. § 687.03(3) (1979).
188. 363 So. 2d at 568.
189. Id. at 567.
190. FLA. STAT. § 687.03(1)-(2) (1973); id. § 687.03(3) (1975).
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for the same disposition of this case.
In a separate case, the Third District also determined that a
chancellor had not abused his discretion in refusing to foreclose a
usurious mortgage where the lender was "without clean hands." In-
stead, the chancellor had entered a money judgment for the
amount of the loan, less civil usury penalties. The district court
noted that the chancellor also could have held it against the public
policy of Florida to enforce a usurious mortgage.191
VIII. FORECLOSURE
A. Jurisdiction
A wide range of jurisdictional issues arose before the Florida
courts in 1979. Of particular note were three decisions enforcing a
foreign judgment on Florida defendants, applying res judicata in a
deficiency action to bar claims omitted from the previous foreclo-
sure, and allowing an arguably premature foreclosure action by a
third mortgagee under the doctrine of "anticipatory breach."
In First National Bank v. Collins,192 an Arkansas court as-
serted long-arm jurisdiction over Florida residents. A Florida hus-
band and wife owned land in Arkansas which they mortgaged to an
Arkansas bank. The Arkansas bank brought foreclosure proceed-
ings and, in accordance with Arkansas law, mailed a letter to the
owners in Florida with return receipt requested. A copy of the
complaint, an affidavit, and a notice of lis pendens accompanied
the letter. After a default judgment against the owners, the prop-
erty was sold, and a deficiency judgment was entered. The bank
then instituted suit to domesticate the Arkansas deficiency judg-
ment in Florida. The defendants resisted on the grounds that the
Arkansas court lacked jurisdiction over them. The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, held that the service of process was
made properly in accordance with Arkansas law, 198 and that the
Arkansas court had personal jurisdiction over the owners. Further-
more, the court found no violation of due process standards, be-
cause (1) the owners had acted purposefully in Arkansas by owning
land there, (2) the cause of action arose from the owners' actions in
Arkansas, and (3) these acts had substantial connection with the
191. Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Portela, 364 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per
curiam).
192. 372 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
193. Service of process was perfected under Arkansas' long-arm statute, ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 27-2502, -2503 (1979).
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State of Arkansas, the forum state."9'
In Horne v. Smith,'" second mortgagees foreclosed and ac-
quired title to the property subject to the first mortgage, but failed
to claim taxes and ground lease payments allegedly due. Under the
doctrine of res judicata, the second mortgagees could not later
claim these omitted items in a second action for a deficiency judg-
ment. Moreover, the second mortgagees could not recover these
items under the terms of the first mortgage (which the second
mortgagor had assumed and agreed to pay), because as present
owners of the property they were merely making payments for
their own benefit. Although the plaintiffs had remitted the taxes
and ground lease payments after the foreclosure of the second
mortgage, the court denied them relief because of the presumption
that a buyer's bid at a foreclosure includes an allowance for prior
liens.
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, ruled on a foreclosure action filed
before default. The court held that a mortgagor's unequivocal dec-
laration to a third mortgagee that he was not going to pay the
mortgage payments on the first and second mortgages and that he
was going into bankruptcy constituted an anticipatory breach of
the first and second mortgages. The third mortgagee was thus al-
lowed to accelerate payments on the third mortgage, which had
provided that failure to pay senior mortgages constituted a breach
of the third mortgage. 96 The rationale of the court was that under
the peculiar facts of this case, it was necessary to apply the con-
cept of anticipatory breach 179 in order to allow the third mortgagee
to file foreclosure proceedings in advance of bankruptcy proceed-
ings. If foreclosure proceedings were filed after the filing of the
bankruptcy proceedings, the foreclosure would be delayed during
the bankruptcy.198 In a well-reasoned dissent, Judge Schwartz
noted that the majority's exception to the general rule on anticipa-
tory breaches had the effect of rewriting the parties' mortgage
contract.199
Four other cases arose in the Third District. One panel held
194. 372 So. 2d at 112.
195. 368 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
196. Poinciana Hotel v. Kasden, 370 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
197. As a general rule, the doctrine of anticipatory breach is not applicable to a unilat-
eral contract where the only obligation is to pay money. The court recognized this, but felt
that the peculiar circumstances constituted a "rare exception" to the general rule. Id.
198. Id. at 402.
199. Id. (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 34:499
COMMERCIAL LAW
that in a mortgage foreclosure action, a trial court should set aside
a default judgment against the mortgagor on the ground of im-
proper service of process if: (1) the record fails to show that the
plaintiff-mortgagee diligently sought to ascertain the defendant-
mortgagor's residential address and (2) the only notice and com-
plaint delivered to -the defendant did not list him as a party
defendant.
200
Another Third District panel held that when a trial court has
jurisdiction over both the mortgage foreclosure action and the par-
ties, the mortgagor may not later collaterally attack the foreclosure
judgment as to a portion of the subject property.20 1 Furthermore,
the final judgment may not be modified or vacated more than a
year later, either by a motion under rule 1.540(b) of the Florida
Rules of Civil .Procedure'" or by collateral attack in a separate
suit.
The Third District decided that it is reversible error for a trial
court to suspend the interest on a mortgage during two periods:
between the date of the mortgage and the date when a specific
written demand for payment was made, and between the time the
plaintiff-mortgagor was served with the complaint and the date of
final judgment. Nor does a trial court have the power to order that
sporadic payments made by the mortgagor be applied to the reduc-
tion of principal, if both the note and mortgage provided that pay-
ments be applied to the accrued interest. Rather, the payments
must be applied in accordance with the written contracts.'0
In United States Freedom Tower, Inc. v. Citibank,0 " the
Third District held that "the covenant of a mortgagor to pay real
estate taxes is a contract right conferred upon the mortgage holder




In Provident National Bank v. Thunderbird Associates,0 6 a
200. McAlice v. Kirsch, 368 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
201. Sailboat Key Developers v. Sun Bank, 367 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (per
curiam).
202. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) provides that a party may be relieved from a final judg-
ment only if motion for such relief is made within one year after the judgment was entered.
203. Florance v. Johnson, 366 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
204. 372 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (per curiam).
205. Id. at 125.
206. 364 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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Florida district court of appeal decided a case of apparent first im-
pression in the United States. The court held that when a mortga-
gee bid at the foreclosure sale the entire amount adjudicated as
owing, and the property's market value was less than the amount
bid, the foreclosing mortgagee-bidder had no right to a deficiency
judgment. The court rejected the argument that in fixing the
amount of the deficiency, "the true market value, rather than the
foreclosure sale high bid, should be the benchmark. ' 20 7 The court
declared:
Although the amount for which mortgage property sells at a
foreclosure sale is not conclusive as to either the value of the
property nor the right to a deficiency judgment, the deficiency
may not exceed the difference between the [sale price of] the
property and the amount of the indebtedness secured by the
final judgment of foreclosure.20
The mortgagee had a right to compensation only for those items
secured by the final judgment of foreclosure, plus interest.
The court in Thunderbird further held that when the success-
ful bidder made substantial payments to the first mortgagee after
the date of foreclosure judgment, but before the sale, in order to
prevent it from foreclosing, these payments would not be secured
by the second mortgage because the final judgment of foreclosure
fixed the amount owed.2 09 Finally, any amounts paid by the fore-
closing mortgagee prior to the foreclosure judgment, but not in-
cluded in it, could not be included later in a hearing for the defi-
ciency, because the foreclosure judgment had become final and
could not be amended.21
0
In a different situation, the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, held that when a deficiency judgment is sought, the price
bid at a foreclosure sale does not conclusively determine the value
of the property. The court may consider the bid as one factor in
ascertaining a deficiency. Moreover, the burden is on the mortga-
gor to prove the fair market price of the property. In the absence
of other evidence, however, the court may use the bid price as the
market value of the property."
Normally, the award of a deficiency judgment rests in the
207. Id. at 795.
208. Id. at 796.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 795.
211. Fara Mfg. Co. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan, 366 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); see
FLA. STAT. § 45.013(7) (1979).
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sound discretion of the trial court, but in Horne v. Smith," the
District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed a trial court's
award as "not supported by the evidence,. . . fallacious, and over-
look[ing]" certain facts." s The second mortgagee had invested a
substantial sum of money in the property, including payment of
substantial penalties caused by the prior mortgagor's default.
Thus, the trial court erred in limiting the deficiency judgment by
crediting the mortgagors with the amount by which the market
value exceeded the balance of the first mortgage.
C. Redemption
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, it is improper for a trial
court to condition the mortgagor's right to redeem upon the pay-
ment of mechanic's liens; only the amount claimed by the foreclos-
ing mortgagee, plus costs, is due. " " The defendant mortgagor may
not be required to pay an amount in excess of the mortgagee's
claim before being permitted to save his property from foreclosure.
In Dove Investments v. Forman,15 the district court affirmed
a trial court's final judgment extending a mortgagor's period for
redemption beyond the ten-day period provided by statute."' In a
case of first impression, the court held that because the trial court
had partially adopted the statutory procedures for judicial sales
and because the court clerk had issued no certificate of title at the
time of trial, the order had lain within the trial court's discretion.
D. Attorney's Fees
It is reversible error for a trial court to award attorney's fees
based solely on the self-serving testimony of the interested attor-
ney in a mortgage foreclosure action. In Mullane v. Lorenz,'" the
district court held that there was an inadequate basis to determine
what "reasonable attorney's fees" were without independent expert
testimony on the record, so the court remanded the cause for a
further hearing.
212. 368 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
213. Id. at 394.
214. Flagler Center Bldg. Loan Corp. v. Chemical Realty Corp., 363 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1978).
215. 369 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
216. FLA. STAT. § 45.031(1) (1979) provides in part that a court will not specify a time
for redemption, but that the person may redeem the property at any time before the sale.
217. 372 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
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E. Miscellaneous
In Harbor Village v. Cahm,2"8 a land sale contract provided
that if the seller failed to convey, the seller would return the
buyer's deposit and be released from all liability. The contract pro-
vided further that it was subordinate to an existing mortgage. The
District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the buyer did
not have a lien which would prevent foreclosure of a mortgage, but
that the claim of purchase was a mere cloud on the title which
could be removed by foreclosure.
Under section 697.04 of the Florida Statutes,1 9 which autho-
rizes "open-end" mortgages (mortgages with a future advance
clause), the promissory notes subsequently executed for the future
advances need not contain a notation that they are secured by the
original mortgage. Other evidence may prove the key factor that
the parties intended that the mortgage would secure the notes.2 20
The author suggests that it would be a wiser practice for the notes
to manifest this intent expressly.
Under the standard A.I.A. Building Contract, the general con-
tractor does not assume responsibility to make certain that the
drawings and specifications comply with the applicable laws and
building codes. As a result, when a bank mortgagee sued the sure-
ties on the contractor's bond for an alleged failure to install fire-
resistant walls in a motel, the contractor was not liable for simply
following the plans and specifications prepared by the architect for
the owner and the mortgagee."'
F. Legislation
Important new legislation raised allowable interest rates, re-
moved certain brokerage fees from possible characterization as in-
terest, and lessened the severity of usury penalties under certain
conditions.
The legislature amended sections 687.04 and 687.11(1) of the
Florida Statutes to provide that the forfeiture sanctions for usuri-
ous lending will not apply if: (1) the lender notifies the borrower of
the usurious interest rate and (2) the lender refunds the amount of
218. 367 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
219. FLA. STAT. § 697.04 (1979) contains no provision requiring that subsequent notes
make reference to the security of the mortgage.
220. Cabot, Cabot & Forbes Land Trust v. First Nat'l Bank, 369 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1979).
221. Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Modular Age, Inc., 363 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
[Vol. 34:499
COMMERCIAL LAW
the overcharge plus interest on the overcharge at the maximum
lawful rate, or, if the borrower is a corporation, at fifteen percent
per annum. But these exceptions apply only if the lender notifies
the borrower before the borrower brings suit or asserts this defense
in a suit by the lender, or before the lender has received written
notice from' the borrower of the usurious interest rate.
222
Of the various amendments made to the Mortgage Brokerage
Act,223 the most important change provides that when a mortgage
broker or solicitor lends its own funds and charges fees or commis-
sions authorized by the Act, the charges are not to be considered
interest under the usury statute if the broker or solicitor assigns
the loan to another lender within ninety days of the date of the
loan.
22 4
Extensively amended, the usury statutes now allow loan com-
panies (under chapter 516), industrial savings banks (under chap-
ter 656), credit unions (under chapter 657), banks for loans not in
excess of $50,000 and for loans or credit extended under bank
credit cards not exceeding $10,000 (under chapter 659), savings as-
sociations (under chapter 665), and other lenders (under chapter
687) to charge eighteen percent per annum simple interest. 25 Re-
tail installment contracts may now call for a finance charge of
twelve dollars per one hundred dollars per year in place of the for-
mer ten-dollar ceiling. 2M The ceiling for finance charges in the
sales of new motor vehicles also rose, from ten dollars to twelve
dollars per one hundred dollars per year.22 7 Loans in excess of
$500,000 may bear interest of twenty-five percent per annum.228
IX. BANKING
A. Governmental Controls
An existing bank was a "substantially affected party" in a pro-
ceeding conducted by the Department of Banking and Finance
upon the application of others to operate a bank. As an "affected
party," however, the bank had no right to formal notice or service
222. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-90, §§ 1-2 (amending FLA. STAT. § 687.04, .11(1) (1977)).
223. Id. ch. 79-296, §§ 1-4 (amending §§ 494.044(1), .08(3), .08(4), .08(7), .081 (1977)).
224. Id. § 3 (amending § 494.081(2) (1977)).
225. Id. ch. 79-274 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 516.02, .031(1), .18(1), .21, 656.17, 657.14,
659.18, .181, 665.381(4), .381(5), 687.02, .03, .11 (1977)).
226. Id. § 6 (amending FLA. STAT. § 520.34(5) (1977)).
227. Id. 8 5 (amending FLA. STAT. § 520.08(1)(a) (1977)).
228. Id. 8 13 (amending FLA. STAT. § 687.03(1) (1977)); see Weaver, The Florida Legis-
lature's Liberalization of Florida Interest Rate Laws, 53 FLA. B.J. 535 (1979).
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for the proceeding. The bank's principals had actual knowledge of
the proceedings and its representatives attended the public hearing
held pursuant to the statute; hence the bank had ample opportu-
nity to file a protest to the other bank's application but failed to
do so. The bank was therefore not a party under section 120.52(1)
of the Florida Statutes. 2 9
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has upheld the
constitutionality of section 659.03(1)(b) and (c) of the Florida Stat-
utes.2"' This statute charges the Department of Banking, upon the
filing of an application for a bank charter, to make an investigation
to determine the need for a new bank in light of existing banking
facilities, the need for further banking facilities, and the present
and future ability of the community to support the proposed bank.
Unsuccessful bank charter applicants contended that the sections
completely lack "legislative standards and guidelines and, there-
fore, constitute an improper delegation of legislative authority. 2 3 1
Acknowledging that the law required discretionary decisions by the
Department of Banking, the court upheld this discretion as limited
because the Department was required to meet due process stand-
ards and basic criteria set by the legislature and to "expose and
elucidate its reasons for discretionary action [taken].' ' 32
B. Usury
In two companion cases, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld
the constitutionality of Florida statutes creating exceptions to the
former rule that legal interest could not exceed ten percent per
annum.233 In the first case, Cesary v. Second National Bank, 2 4 the
court held that section 656.17(1), 235 permitting industrial savings
banks and Morris Plan banks to charge interest at the rate of
14.3% per annum, and section 687.031,286 complementing section
229. Sun Bank v. Department of Banking & Fin., 366 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
(per curiam).
230. Bigler v. Department of Banking & Fin., 368 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
231. Id. at 450; see Gulf State Bank v. Department of Banking & Fin., 367 So. 2d 671
(Fla. 1st DCA 1979), wherein the Department of Banking elucidated its reasons for denying
the application for a bank in Pensacola Beach, Florida on the grounds that the population
was too small and the activity and population too seasonal to "assure reasonable promise of
success." Id. at 672 (citing McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 586
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977)).
232. 368 So. 2d at 451 (citing 346 So. 2d at 584).
233. See note 224 and accompanying text supra.
234. 369 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1979).
235. FLA. STAT. § 656.17(1) (1979).
236. Id. § 687.031 provides that usury statutes shall not be construed to modify or limit
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656.17(1), are not "special laws" prohibited by article III, section
11(a)(9) of the Constitution of the State of Florida.2 7 The court
reasoned that the two sections of the statutes are general laws of
statewide application and that the classification made therein is
reasonable.23 8
In the second case, Catogas v. Southern Federal Savings &
Loan Association,"9 the court held that section 665.395,240 which
exempts "building and loan associations" from the general usury
laws, also exempts federal savings and loan associations under sec-
tion 665.511.241 Finally, in accord with the Cesary case, the court
decided that section 665.395 does not violate the prohibition of
special laws in article III, section 11(a)(9) of the Constitution of
the State of Florida 242 and further, that the statute does not vio-
late the equal protection clause. Savings and loan associations are
thereby bound by the marketplace rather than by ceilings on legal
interest rates.2 43
In a third case, the District Court of Appeal, First District,
held that pursuant to a loan agreement, a bank may charge the
borrower the amount of intangible tax levied by the state on the
note, as a reasonable expense of the loan rather than as interest
restricted by the usury laws. 4
C. Checking and Savings Accounts
There is a strong presumption of a joint tenancy between a
depositor and a joint signer when the signature card states unmis-
existing statutory exceptions.
237. FLA. CONST. art, III, § 11(a)(9) prohibits special laws fixing interest rates on pri-
vate contracts.
238. 369 So. 2d at 920.
239. 369 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1979).
240. FLA. STAT. § 665.395 (1979).
241. Id. § 665.511. The court thereby overturned the decision in Financial Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Burleigh House, Inc., 305 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), which held that
former § 665.40 did not exempt federal savings and loans from the usury statutes. 369 So.
2d at 926.
242. See note 237 supra.
243. In Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), the
Supreme Court of the United States held that a national bank in Nebraska has the right,
under 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976), to charge its credit card customers in Minnesota the interest
rate permitted by Nebraska law, even if the Nebraska rate is usurious under the law of
Minnesota. Under the federal statute, "[any association may take, receive, reserve and
charge on any loan or discount made, . . . interest at the rate allowed by the State . . .
where the bank is located .... " 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976).
244. Brannen v. Southeast Beach State Bank, 365 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). See
also notes 179-83 and accompanying text supra.
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takably that all the money is joint property. Nevertheless, in a case
in which a father and daughter opened savings and checking ac-
counts as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, the father re-
butted this presumption, establishing his equitable ownership of
all of the funds. According to the court, sections 659.29 and
665.271 of the Florida Statutes, dealing with joint accounts, were
designed to protect banks and savings and loan associations, not to
bind the tenants in their rights to the accounts.
24'
Under section 659.29 of the Florida Statutes, a bank may pay
out all the funds from a joint account to one of the joint tenants,
without being liable to the other joint tenant, even though the ag-
grieved joint tenant possesses the sole passbook. The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, so concluded even though the
passbook provided that "[tihe depositor must present this pass-
book together with a written order, to be entitled to withdraw
funds. ' ' 24' The court viewed this legend as designed to protect de-
positors from third persons, not to require either joint tenant to
present the passbook.24
In another case, a bank had issued a certificate of deposit pro-
viding that the bank reserved the right not to renew the certificate
at the expiration of the original period. The court held that the
bank had automatically renewed the certificate by failing to give
written notice in accordance with the bank's own contractual
provision.24
D. Garnishment
In a garnishment proceeding, a grant of attorney's fees to an
intervening bank under section 679.504 of the Florida Statutes24 9 is
not justified if the bank did not acquire its collection under that
section and no testimony supports such a fee allowance. 50
Although section 222.11 of the Florida Statutes exempts from
garnishment any wages due to the head of a household, once these
wages are deposited in a bank account they are no longer "due for
245. Constance v. Constance, 366 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
246. Gray v. Landmark Trust Bank, 364 So. 2d 1256, 1257 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The
court refused to follow the seemingly contrary case of Badders v. Peoples Trust Co., 236
Ind. 357, 140 N.E.2d 235 (1957).
247. 364 So. 2d at 1257.
248. Miami Nat'l Bank v. Weinstock, 365 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
249. U.C.C. § 9-504 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 679.504 (1979)).




the personal labor . . . of such person" and are subject to
garnishment.
25'
In Sentry Indemnity Co. v. Hendricks Enterprises,252 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that when a garnishee's
agent receives a writ of garnishment and a motion for writ of gar-
nishment after judgment and mails them to its out-of-state home
office, a subsequent default judgment may not be set aside for ex-
cusable neglect. "A showing of gross abuse of the trial court's dis-
cretion is necessary to reverse a ruling on a motion to vacate and
set aside a default. '253 The court held there was no such gross
abuse where the garnishee failed to show what happened to the
papers or offer an excuse for its failure to respond. It was im-
proper, however, for the trial court to enter a default judgment for
an amount greater than that claimed by the garnishor.
E. Legislation
State banking legislation in the last year provided for savings
and loan associations to handle "convenience accounts," increased
the asset reserve requirements of international banking agencies li-
censed in Florida, imposed new citizenship requirements on bank
and trust company directors, and established fingerprint require-
ments for proposed officers, directors, promoters, and holders of at
least five percent of the voting stock of proposed banking
institutions.2 4
An amendment to section 659.11(2) of the Florida Statutes
25 5
requires that at least a majority of the directors of a state bank or
trust company be United States citizens during their whole term of
service.
Another amendment requires that all organizers, proposed di-
rectors, proposed chief executive and operational officers, and per-
sons subscribing to five percent or more of the voting stock of pro-
posed state banks, trust companies, and state savings and loan
associations submit to the Department of Banking a complete set
of fingerprints taken by an authorized law enforcement officer. The
Department must submit these fingerprints to appropriate law en-
251. Holmes v. Blazer Financial Serv., Inc., 369 So. 2d 987, 989 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
252. 371 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
253. Id. at 1106.
254. For a discussion of recent developments in banking legislation, see Baena, Banking
Law, 1979 Developments in Florida Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 375 (1980).
255. FLA. STAT. § 659.11(2) (1979).
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forcement agencies for processing.2'
A change in the Banking Code2 5 7 provides that certificates of
deposit are not included under the definition of "convenience ac-
count." The amendment also authorizes agents of convenience ac-
counts to deposit or withdraw funds in these accounts.2
The Savings Association Act259 was amended to allow Florida
savings and loan associations to handle convenience accounts. 6
The amendment also authorizes these associations to pay the bal-
ance of convenience accounts, upon the principal's death or incom-
petence, to the following: (1) the guardian of the property of the
principal of these accounts; (2) any persons designated in a court
order pursuant to section 735.206 (summary administration distri-
bution) of the Florida Statutes;' 1 (3) any person designated by let-
ter or other writing under section 735.301 (disposition without ad-
ministration) of the Florida Statutes;' 2 or (4) the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased principal's estate. Under this provision,
the payment by the association discharges it from all claims for
payment. In addition, if the principal is indebted to the association
and there are no contractual provisions to the contrary, the associ-
ation has a right to set-off against the account.
A recent amendment requires an international banking corpo-
ration to have assets with a value of at least twenty-five million
dollars in excess of its liabilities in order to establish an interna-
tional bank agency, and ten million dollars in excess of its liabili-
ties to establish a representative office. Furthermore, any interna-
tional banking corporation licensed as an international bank
agency under section 659.67 of the Florida Statutes'" may, if au-
thorized by rules of the Department of Banking, make any loan or
investment or exercise any power which the agency could make or
exercise if it were operating in Florida as a federal agency under
the Federal International Banking Act of 1978.2" Finally, interna-
tional bank agencies may maintain reserves similar to those re-
256. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-144, § 1 (adding FLA. STAT. § 659.02(3) (1979)).
257. Id. §§ 658.01-666.44.
258. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-22, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 659.292(1), .293 (1977)).
259. FLA. STAT. §§ 665.011-.717 (1979).
260. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-21, §§ 1-2 (amending FLA. STAT. § 665.271 (1977) and adding
id. § 665.272).
261. FLA. STAT. § 735.206 (1979).
262. Id. § 735.301.
263. FLA. STAT. § 659.67 (1979).
264. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, §§ 21-213, 92 Stat. 607
(amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 21-213 (1976)).
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quired for agencies under the Federal International Banking Act of
1978,265 or other reserves appropriate to the nature of the business
being conducted by the international bank agency.
266
.Recent amendments also relaxed usury restrictions on foreign
loans. Loans made by any international bank agency or Edge Act
Corporation to borrowers who are neither residents nor citizens of
the United States will not be subject to the usury provisions of
chapter 687 of the Florida Statutes,267 provided that the loans are
clearly related to and usual in international or foreign business. 2
Such loans will continue, however, to be subject to the loan-shark-
ing provisions of Florida Statutes section 687.071.
F. Miscellaneous
In an action to collect the balance due from an individual who
issued one promissory note and guaranteed another payable to a
liquidated bank, the mere allegation that the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (FDIC) had been appointed as liquidator of
the bank's assets did not suffice to give the FDIC standing to sue.
In Weisser v. FDICe 9 a copy of the order of the federal district
court in New York appointing the FDIC as liquidator was inadmis-
sible as evidence under section 92.10 of the Florida Statutes, which
requires authentication by the attestation and seal of the officer
having charge of the records of the court. Left with the bare allega-
tion, the FDIC failed to carry its burden of proving it was a party
to or privy with any of the subject instruments.
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Sun Bank27 0 a hospital had sued its
accountant for an alleged failure to discover and report a continu-
ing embezzlement by the hospital's officer. The accounting firm
then brought against the hospital's bank a third party complaint
for contribution, on the theory that the bank had allowed the em-
bezzlement to occur by honoring checks signed by the embezzler.
The court held that the accounting firm had no right of contribu-
tion from the bank, because each party was not exposed to the hos-
pital under the same set of circumstances, and they did not share a
265. Id.
266. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-145, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 659.67(5)(a), .67(7)(a)
(1977), and adding id. § 659.67(6)(f), .67(6)(g)).
267. FLA. STAT. §§ 687.01-.12 (1979).
268. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. § 79-138, § 1 (adding FLA. STAT. § 687.13 (1977)).
269. 365 So. 2d 1034, 1035 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (per curiam).
270. 366 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
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Section 501.211(3) of the Florida Statutes272 provides that in a
proceeding under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practice
Law27 a court may order the plaintiff to post a bond when the
defendant asserts that the case is frivolous and lacks legal merit.
Declaring that a court may require the posting of a bond, after
hearing evidence as to the necessity therefor,27' the statute has
been construed as requiring a hearing before a court may order a
plaintiff to post a bond.27 6
In two cases, the district courts limited the application of con-
sumer credit statutes. Firit, the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, held that where a construction contract called for cash
within sixty days of the completion of real property improvements,
a subsequent note and second mortgage taken by the contractor
after the property owner failed to pay was not within the Federal
Truth in Lending Act. 76 Noting that the original contract was a
cash transaction, the court held that "the nature and character of
the underlying obligation" determine whether the Act applies.
2 7
7
Consequently, when the contractor tried to foreclose, the owner
had no right to rescind the contract since his case did not come
under the Act.
Second, in Carter Opticians, Inc. v. Davis,27s a woman ordered
prescription glasses from an optician, who ground the lenses and
tendered the glasses to her on the same day of the order. The wo-
man refused to pay on the same day of the order. The woman re-
fused to pay for and accept the glasses because she no longer
wanted them. After the optician explained that he could not sell
the glasses to anyone else because the lenses had been ground es-
pecially for her, he informed the woman's employer that she had,
271. Id. at 467.
272. FLA. STAT. § 501.211(3) (1979).
273. Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-.213
(1979).
274. Id. § 501.211(3) (1979).
275. Hamilton v. Palm Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc., 366 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
276. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976).
277. Florida State Constructors Serv., Inc. v. Randall, 368 So. 2d 421, 422 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979).
278. 367 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
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refused to pay for the glasses. The optician then sued the woman
for payment, and she counterclaimed on the ground that the opti-
cian's communication to her employer violated section 559.72 of
the Florida Statutes,27 ' which forbids a creditor with a consumer
claim from communicating with a debtor's employer. The court
held that although the optician had not received payment in ad-
vance, he had not extended credit; it was a cash-on-delivery sale.
Since there had been no extension of credit within the meaning of
the statute, the optician had committed no violation.2 8
In Marchion Terrazzo, Inc. v. Altman, 81 the district court re-
versed the trial court's award of attorney's fees under the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.2 2 Defendant pled a vi-
olation of the Act as a defense to an action to recover the balance
due on a construction contract, and the trial judge allowed $500 for
his attorney, despite an uncontroverted affidavit showing at least
twenty-five hours spent on that aspect of the litigation. The court
noted, however, its preference that expert witnesses testify on the
factual issue of attorney's fees, although the court may base an
award on affidavits if neither party objects.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that in a suit
by the debtor against the lender for a breach of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act, 88 a creditor's counterclaim for the amount of the unpaid
debt is compulsory. Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to
hear the counterclaim even though it would not have had jurisdic-
tion had the lender's claim been brought as an independent action.
The court ruled, however, that the counterclaim for the debt could
not be offset against an award of attorney's fees for the suing




Important legislation amended the Consumer Finance Act
with respect to interest chargeable after default and to a lender's
ability to relocate within a county, enacted a Sale of Business Op-
portunities Act to protect purchasers intending to start a business,
279. FLA. STAT. § 559.72 (1979).
280. 367 So. 2d at 229.
281. 372 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
282. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (1979).
283. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976).
284. Plant v. Blazer Financial Serv., Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1365-66 (5th Cir.), rehearing
en banc denied, 604 F.2d 555 (1979).
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and amended the Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Law to
broaden the definition of "consumer" and provide attorney's fees
for prevailing parties in actions brought by an enforcing authority.
Under an addition to the Florida Consumer Finance Act,2 5 li-
censed lenders may continue to charge interest on the balance of
an unpaid loan, at the permitted contractual rate, for a period not
in excess of twelve months after default. Thereafter, interest may
not exceed ten percent per annum.
A licensed lender under the Consumer Finance Act 2s may
now, with the permission of the Department of Banking and Fi-
nance, remove its place of business to a different location in the
same county. Prior to the amendment, licensed lenders could move
only within the same city or town. 8
The Sale of Business Opportunities Act 258 will regulate the
purchase and lease of products, equipment, supplies, or services for
the purpose of starting a business. The Act aims at preventing the
fraudulent and deceptive practices of sellers who represent that
they will help the buyer find a certain location or purchase needed
equipment, or who offer to provide a sales program or marketing
device at a cost of more than fifty dollars.28 9 The Act requires the
seller to furnish a detailed disclosure statement to the buyer at
least seventy-two hours before the purchaser signs the contract or
the seller receives any consideration, whichever comes first.2 90 Sell-
ers must file the disclosure statements with the Division of Con-
sumer Services of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services before advertising the sale of a business opportunity. The
Act also delineates the specific terms that must appear in the con-
tract. In the event that the seller fails to comply with the Act, the
buyer may rescind the sale and recover attorney's fees. 91
The legislature made. various amendments to the Deceptive
and Unfair Trade Practices Law. 92 Two of the most important
changes included, first, the redefinition of the term "consumer":
"'Consumer' means an individual; child, by and through its parent
or legal guardian; firm; association; joint adventure; partnership;
285. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-59 (adding FLA. STAT. § 516.035 (1979)).
286. FLA. STAT. §§ 516.001-.37 (1979).
287. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-340 (amending FLA. STAT. § 516.09 (Supp. 1978)).
288. Id. ch. 79-374 (creating the Sale of Business Opportunities Act, FLA. STAT. §§
559.80-.815 (1979)).
289. FLA. STAT. § 559.801 (1979).
290. Id. § 559.803.
291. Id. § 559.811.
292. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-386 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (1977)).
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estate; trust; business trust; syndicate; fiduciary; corporation; or
any other group or combination. '"2 93 Under this sweeping defini-
tion, the largest multinational corporation apparently could bring a
complaint against one of its smallest suppliers under the Act; the
word "consumer" appears to have lost all meaning.
Second, in any civil litigation initiated by the enforcing au-
thority, the court may now award to the prevailing party reasona-
ble attorney's fees and costs if the court finds "a complete absence
of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party,
or if the court finds bad faith on the part of the losing party."29 4
Attorney's fees may also be awarded to the enforcing authority in
any administrative proceeding.2 95
XI. SECURITY AGREEMENTS
Most security agreements are in writing, but section 9-203(1)
of the U.C.C.21 permits a security agreement to be oral, provided
that the collateral is in the hands of the lender. A recent case held
that the possessory requirements of section 9-203(1) were met
when a lender advanced funds to his borrower to enable the bor-
rower to purchase stock from a broker. The broker had delivered
the stock to the lender's attorney, who then delivered it to the
lender, who then redelivered it to the broker to be held pending a
court adjudication of ownership.2
In C.Q. Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 98 the court reached an
anomalous result by allowing a claim by a debtor to enforce an
agreement that the creditor arguably could not have enforced. The
lender allegedly made it a practice to enter parol agreements with
the debtor-farmer to extend credit in return for the debtor's ac-
counts receivable. In an action by the lender for an account due
and owing, the borrower counterclaimed for business damages re-
sulting from the lender's failure to extend the promised line of
credit. The court held that the amount orally agreed upon was a
jury question. The decision appears unfair, because under section
9-203(1) of the U.C.C., a security interest "is not enforceable
against the debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral
and does not attach unless: (a) the collateral is in the possession of
293. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(a) (1979).
294. Id. § 501.210(5).
295. Id. § 501.210(6).
296. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398 (amending FLA. STAT. § 679.203(1) (1977)).
297. Hartzog v. Dixon, 366 So. 2d 848, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
298. 363 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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the secured party . . . or the debtor has signed a security agree-
ment."s  Since there is no way to possess accounts receivable, the
creditor could not have enforced the parol security agreement
against the debtor or third parties; yet the Cargill court permitted
the debtor to enforce the loan against the creditor.
A used car seller, who holds the title certificate as collateral
for the buyer's installment purchase, has the legal title to the car
while the buyer has the beneficial title. Thus, in McCall v. Gar-
land, 00 when the debtor-buyer was involved in a fatal accident five
days after taking possession, the seller was not liable for the negli-
gent operation of the car simply because he had held the naked
legal title.
Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Atlantic Banks°" was a case
of first impression under the Florida version of the U.C.C. The
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that a floor plan
financer, who perfects a security interest by filing a financing state-
ment covering all present and after-acquired inventory of a motor
home retailer, has priority over the lien of a subsequent lender
filed prior to the issuance of a title certificate for one of the mobile
homes still in inventory. The court pointed out that section
319.27(1) of the Florida Statutes, governing title certificates, pro-
vides that no lien is effective upon a motor vehicle unless the lien
is noted upon the certificate of title, but the statute expressly ex-
empts from this procedure any "motor vehicle floor plan stock of
any motor vehicle dealer." a0s 2 Section 9-302(3)(b) of the U.C.C.
08
provides that it, rather than Florida's certificate of title procedure,
applies to perfection of inventory or "floor plan" security interests.
The court therefore reasoned that the first to perfect under the
Code has a right to rely on that filing and should prevail. The
court also held correctly that the second lender did not cut off the
first lender's security interest as a buyer in ordinary course of busi-
ness30 4 under sections 1-201(9) 805 and 9-307(1)101 because the sec-
299. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398 (amending FLA. STAT. § 679.203(1) (1977)). Comment 1
to U.C.C. § 9-305 provides that a security interest in accounts may be perfected under arti-
cle 9 only by filing, as it is property not ordinarily represented by any writing whose delivery
operates to transfer the claim.
300. 371 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (per curiam).
301. 364 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
302. FLA. STAT. § 319.27(1) (1979).
303. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398, § 14 (amending FLA. STAT. § 679.302(3)(b) (1977)).
304. The court was incorrect, however, in stating that the second lender was not a "pur-
chaser." It was a purchaser under section 1-201(33), FLA. STAT. § 671.201(33) (1979), but it
was not a "buyer" under section 1-201(9), 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398, § 2 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 671.201(9) (1977)). The words "purchaser" and "buyer" are words of art under the
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ond lender was a lender, not a buyer.0 The court failed to men-
tion that a second lender in a situation of this kind can never gain
priority over a first lender, unless the second lender is a purchase-
money lender complying with the rigid requirements of section 9-
312(3) of the Code.
0 8
A perfected security interest in inventory motor vehicles also
has priority over a subsequently recorded warrant for unpaid sales
taxes issued under section 212.15 of the Florida Statutes.3 09 Al-
though section 197.056 of the Florida Statutes provides that "[a]ll
taxes . . . shall be a first lien, superior to all other liens, on any
property against which the taxes have been assessed,"310 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that this provision "is
obviously intended :to apply to ad valorem taxes on real and per-
sonal property and not to sales taxes."31'
A security agreement must describe encumbered goods so that
third persons would be reasonably able to identify the goods. The
security agreement at issue in American Restaurant Supply Co. v.
Wilson"' described the collateral as: "Food service equipment and
supplies delivered to San Marco Inn at St. Marks, Florida,"" 3 but
attempted to cover only some of the food service equipment and
supplies. This description might have sufficed for the financing
statement, but not for the security agreement.31 4 The description
did not "do its assigned job of making possible the identification of
the equipment and supplies in which [the lender] claim[ed] an
interest."31 5
Code and should not be confused.
305. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398, § 2 (amending FLA. STAT. § 671.201(9) (1977)).
306. FLA. STAT. § 679.307(1) (1979).
307. 364 So. 2d at 37.
308. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398, § 22 (amending FLA. STAT. § 679.312(3) (Supp. 1978)).
309. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-359 (amending FLA. STAT. § 212.15 (Supp. 1978)).
310. FLA. STAT. § 197.056(1) (1979).
311. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Tom Norton Motor Co., 366 So. 2d 131, 132
(Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (emphasis by the court).
312. 371 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
313. Id. at 490.
314. Id.; U.C.C. § 9-208, Comment 2 (1978) notes that unless a copy of the security
agreement itself is filed as the financing statement, third parties are told neither the amount
nor the particular assets concerned.
315. 371 So. 2d at 491; see FLA. STAT. § 679.110 (1979).
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XII. REMEDIES
A. Repossession, Replevin, and Related Matters
Under section 9-503 of the U.C.C.1 6 the secured party has a
right of repossession of the collateral upon default by the debtor; if
self-help will not avail, then the secured party may replevy the
goods. In Midland-Guardian Co. v. Hagin,1 7 the court held that
an assignee of the original lender, having recourse against the
lender in the event of the debtor's default, retains the same right
to replevin. That the debtor or his assignee and not the secured
party has title to the goods does not affect the right to replevin
because under section 9-202 of the U.C.C., title is immaterial.818
Upon the filing of a replevin complaint, a court must, under
section 78.065(2)(e) of the Florida Statutes, 19 allow the owner of
the goods an opportunity to appear personally or by way of an at-
torney to present testimony at a show-cause hearing. Where a
show-cause order contains such a provision, it is error for a trial
court to bar the defendant owner's testimony and to enter an order
of replevin.82 0 Further, since section 78.068(3) of the Florida Stat-
utes"' sets the replevin bond at the lesser of twice the value of the
goods or twice the balance due on the debt, the trial court may not
set an arbitrary amount as bond.
Principles applicable to security agreements for sales of goods
may similarly apply to leases, when the facts reveal that the par-
ties to a lease intend to create a security interest. In BVA Credit
Corp. v. Fisher,8 21 an equipment lease provided for the filing of a
financing statement which designated the lessor as a "secured
party." Hence, the lessor could take possession of the equipment
upon the lessee's default in rent payments, lease it to a second
lessee, repossess upon a second default, and finally sell the equip-
ment and recover, from the original lessee, any deficiency in
amount due under the entire first lease. The court applied princi-
ples of mitigation of damages and the Code rule that the second
lease and subsequent sale did not constitute an election of reme-
dies and did not bar the proceeding against the first lessee.
316. FLA. STAT. § 679.503 (1979).
317. 370 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
318. FLA. STAT. § 679.202 (1979).
319. Id. § 78.065(2)(e) (1979) (as amended by 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-396).
320. Vega v. Hughes, 370 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
321. FLA. STAT. § 78.068(3) (1979).
322. 369 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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A recent case revealed a startling gap in the protection af-
forded mobile home buyers by section 320.77(11) of the Florida
Statutes. 3 ' The statute requires that mobile home dealers in Flor-
ida be bonded to ensure the dealer's compliance "with the condi-
tions of any written contract made by him in connection with the
sale or exchange of any mobile home."' 82 ' In CMI Credit Insurance,
Inc. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,325 a mobile home
dealer sold three mobile homes for the plaintiff's credit insurance
company under an oral agreement and did not pay the proceeds to
the credit company. The court held that because the agreement
was oral, the credit company's loss was not covered by the statute
or the terms of the surety bond, which tracked the language of the
statute.32 6
The general rule in Florida in any action, including reposses-
sion cases, is that an award of punitive damages must rest on an
underlying award of compensatory damages.2 7 In Raffa v. Dania
Bank,"'5 a case involving the alleged wrongful conversion of a car
by a bank, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed a
punitive damage award of $25,000 because the jury had awarded
no compensatory damages.
B. Deficiency Judgments
When a security agreement tracks the language of section 9-
504(3) of the U.C.C., 29 by providing that after repossession of the
collateral the lender would give the debtor reasonable notice of any
public sale or of the time after which any private sale or other dis-
position would be made, the lender will be denied a deficiency
judgment against the debtor for failure to give such notice. In
Thomas v. Sutherland,830 the security agreement provided that no
notice was necessary if the collateral was perishable, threatened to
decline speedily in value, or was of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market. In the absence of any of those factors, the court
denied a deficiency judgment to the lender, who had failed to no-
323. FLA. STAT. § 320.77(11) (1979).
324. Id. (emphasis in original).
325. 365 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
326. Id. at 460.
327. McLain v. Pensacola Coach Corp., 152 Fla. 876, 13 So. 2d 221 (1943); Sonson v.
Nelson, 357 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
328. 372 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
329. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398 (amending FLA. STAT. § 679.504(3) (1977)).
330. 370 So. 2d 12, 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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tify the debtor.
A federal district court has extended the notice requirement
imposed by Florida law. Formerly, a guarantor of an obligation was
deemed a "debtor" and entitled to notice of sale after repossession
before a lender could recover a deficiency judgment."' 1 In Commer-
cial Credit Corp. v. Lane,3 32 the court extended the rule to apply
to the guarantor of a guarantor. In Lane, a mobile home retailer
took back security agreements, assigning them to a finance com-
pany. The assignments were made with recourse, with the retailer
promising to reimburse the finance company for any resulting
losses, or to repurchase the chattel paper-in effect agreeing to re-
possess the mobile homes and guarantee payment. The individual
owners of the retail company also individually guaranteed the per-
formance of the retailer to the finance company. When some con-
sumers defaulted, the retailer failed to repossess the mobile homes.
The finance company repossessed and sold the homes-without
giving notice to the individual guarantors. The federal court held,
extending Florida decisional law, that the guarantors of the retail
guarantor had a right to notice of sale and were not liable for a
deficiency judgment to the finance company that failed to give
notice.3 83
C. Forfeiture of Collateral
It is commonly stated that a car is not subject to forfeiture
unless it is used for drug trafficking (as distinguished from the
mere personal possession and use of narcotics). A district court
recently held that a single sale of narcotics triggers a forfeiture
when negotiations, delivery, and payment all occur in the car."
Under sections 943.43 and 943.44 of the Florida Statutes,33 a
vehicle used in transporting contraband cannot be forfeited if the
owner or lienholder had no express or implied knowledge of that
use by another person." The federal rule is to the contrary; the
331. Hepworth v. Orlando Bank & Trust Co., 323 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Turk
v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 281 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
332. 466 F. Supp. 1326 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
333. Id. at 1332-33.
334. Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297, 299 (Fla. 1978) (interpreting the Florida Uniform
Contraband Transportation Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-.44 (1979)).
335. Mosley v. State ex rel. Broward County, 363 So. 2d 172, 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
If the car is used as part of a scheme to deliver drugs, it will, of course, be subjected to
forfeiture. State ex rel. Fort Lauderdale v. Franzer, 364 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
336. FLA. STAT. §§ 943.43-.44 (1979).
337. One 1973 Cadillac v. State, 372 So. 2d 103, 104 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
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innocence of the owner or lienholder is immaterial.33 8
D. Legislation
The legislature has adopted most of the provisions of the 1972
Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code, s but neither the
legislature nor the sponsors have acknowledged the source of these
amendments.3 40 In addition, the sponsors have made some sub-
stantive and cosmetic changes.34 1 The cosmetic changes in lan-
guage and punctuation are, in the opinion of this author, unneces-
sary at best and irritating at worst. Moreover, the sponsors made
annoying changes in format, such as breaking large paragraphs
into separately numbered paragraphs, which might lead to misin-
terpretation of the law, and changing the official number of subsec-
tions to an alphabetical system. The sponsors also made a few mi-
nor changes in substance, not worth discussing.
34 2
One change of great importance is the omission of subsection
9-301(4), which attempts to give secured parties priorities over a
federal tax lien in certain circumstances. The drafters intended
this subsection to mesh with subsections 6323(c)(2) and (d) of the
Internal Revenue Code as amended by the Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966.344 Without subsection 9-301(4), secured parties in Florida
will have less protection than secured parties in other states.4
Unfortunately and unaccountably, the legislature also omitted
338. United States v. One 1967 Cadillac Coupe Eldorado, 415 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. One 1950 Burger Yacht, 395 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
339. U.C.C. (1972 version).
340. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398.
341. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 671.201, 679.102, .103(1)(d), .104, .105, .107, .203, .302,
.304, .306, .308, .312(4), .403, .408 & .504 (1977)).
342. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 679.403-.407 (1977)).
343. U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1972) provides:
A person who becomes a lien creditor while a security interest is. perfected takes
subject to the security interest only to the extent that it secures advances made
before he becomes a lien creditor or within 45 days thereafter or made without
knowledge of the lien or pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowl-
edge of the lien.
Other parts of U.C.C. § 9-301 (1972) can be found in 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398 (amend-
ing FLA. STAT. § 679.301 (1977)).
344. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966).
345. The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 contemplated the priority of security interests
for advances over a federal tax lien for 45 days after the federal tax lien had been filed. This
priority, however, is operational only where so provided by state law. U.C.C. § 9-301(4) was
designed to bring state law into conformity with the Act, so that secured parties within the
state would henceforth be protected to its full extent. See U.C.C. § 9-301, Reasons for 1972
change, reprinted in ALI UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 942-43 app. II (West 1978).
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subsection 3 of section 9-307 of the Official Text."" That provision
attempts to state priorities between buyers (other than buyers in
ordinary course of business) and secured parties relative to future
advances.
Section 9-302(1)(c) of the Code.47 lists exceptions to the filing
requirements to perfect a security interest. The Florida version
omits the words "trust or" contained in the official text. Thus, it
appears that in Florida, a financing statement must be filed to per-
fect a security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial in-
terest in a trust, but not to perfect a security interest in the assign-
ment of a beneficial interest in a decedent's estate.
Section 9-401,3 8 which governs the place of filing, was drasti-
cally changed. In Florida, one must file with the clerk of the circuit
court to perfect a security interest when collateral consists of one
of the following: crops (growing or to be grown), timber to be cut,
minerals (including gas and oil) or an interest in minerals that at-
taches at extraction or attaches to an account resulting from sale
at the wellhead or minehead, or fixtures or goods that are to
become fixtures. In all other cases, filing is to be with the Secretary
of State. When crops are the collateral, one must file with both the
Secretary of State and the clerk of the circuit court. Double filing
is required for crops because the sponsors thought that potential
lenders had difficulty searching local records, since many Florida
farms and groves cross county lines; 4 9 yet it is doubtful that this
phenomenon is unique to Florida.
This amendment to the filing section also requires that con-
sumer financing statements now be recorded in the office of the
Secretary of State, instead of the office of the local circuit court
clerk. This change protects lenders giving credit to an increasingly
mobile group of consumers.26 The amendment should eliminate
the problem of vendors and lenders improperly classifying con-
sumer goods as equipment, then filing in the wrong place. Confu-
346. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398 (amending FLA. STAT. § 679.307 (1977)); U.C.C. § 9-
307(3) (1972) provides:
A buyer other than a buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (1) of this
section) takes free of a security interest to the extent that it secures future ad-
vances made after the secured party acquires knowledge of the purchase, or
more than 45 days after the purchase, whichever first occurs, unless made pursu-
ant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the purchase and before
the expiration of the 45 day period.
347. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398 (amending FLA. STAT. § 679.302(1) (1977)).
348. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 679.401 (1977)).




sion about which filing office to consult should no longer arise, as
lenders try to determine whether claims have been perfected on
collateral that could change in nature. Central filing of consumer
financing statements seems a good change, unless a flood of con-
sumer filings will cause delay in the furnishing of information by
the office of the Secretary of State.
Under the 1972 Official Text of the U.C.C. section 9-505(2), 851
a secured creditor who proposes to keep collateral (after reposses-
sion) in satisfaction of a debt must communicate this intention to
the debtor and, except in the case of consumer goods, to any junior
secured lender from whom he has received written notice of the
junior lender's interest before the senior lender sends notice to the
debtor. In consumer goods cases, a junior lender has no standing to
object to this retention by the prime lender. Under the new Florida
version of this subsection, 5 2 the prime lender must communicate,
except in the case of consumer goods, to all junior lenders who
have duly filed a financing statement. A junior lender has standing
to object in writing within thirty days after the prime lender has
secured possession, even in the case of consumer goods. Further,
junior lenders in Florida have no duty to make their presence
known to the prime lender; the prime lender must check the
records. The Florida version of this section is a hybrid of the 1962
and 1972 official versions of the Uniform Commercial Code. The
Florida version also provides that a debtor or junior lender that
wishes to give up its rights under this section must sign a conspic-
uous statement renouncing or modifying its rights; the 1972 Offi-
cial Text does not require conspicuous print.
Florida has similarly modified section 9-504(3). 8 The Official
Text provides that a prime lender must notify the debtor and the
junior lenders (if they have filed financing statements covering the
collateral) of the time and place of any public sale or the time after
which a private sale of repossessed collateral will take place. There
is an exception when collateral is perishable, threatens to decline
speedily in value, is of a type customarily sold on a recognized
market, or consists of consumer goods. The sponsors in Florida
have amended the section to provide that the debtor may, after
default, renounce or modify his rights to notification of sale by a
signed conspicuous statement to that effect. It seems incongruous
351. U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1972).
352. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398 (amending FLA. STAT. § 679.505(2) (1977)).
353. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 679.504(3) (1977)).
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to this author that a junior secured consumer lender has standing
under amended section 679.505(2) to object to the prime lender's
retention of the collateral in satisfaction of the prime lender's
claim, but may not object to the prime lender's method of foreclo-
sure sale under amended section 679.504(3).
Under newly enacted section 817.562 of the Florida Stat-
utes,35 a debtor under a security agreement, which authorizes him
to sell the property and requires him to account for the proceeds to
the lender, commits criminal fraud if he sells the property and
wrongfully and willfully fails to account for the proceeds. If the
security agreement does not authorize the sale or disposition of the
collateral, the debtor commits criminal fraud if he "knowingly
secrets, withholds, or disposes of such property in violation of the
security agreement." 851
The limited scope of this article precludes an exhaustive anal-
ysis of the differences between the 1962 and 1972 Official Texts of
the U.C.C., but the Florida lawyer should take heed that there is
no shortcut method of learning the numerous and significant
changes. Only a careful reading and analysis of the 1972 Official
Text 5' and the Florida changes 51 will suffice.
E. Miscellaneous
In a suit to enforce a stock-purchase contract between em-
ployee-purchasers and certain officers of the corporation, the trial
court committed reversible error in ordering the rescission or can-
cellation of the contract because of its ambiguity, when neither
party had asserted that claim in the pleading. The order was also
premature because the court should have ruled only on the defen-
dants' motion for a directed verdict, allowing the defendants to
present their case if they lost that motion. 58
One may purchase property from an owner with knowledge of
a suit against the owner and still be a bona fide purchaser for a
good and valuable consideration. The purchaser should establish
his bona fides at trial; the court should not grant the judgment
creditor a summary judgment before trial if the purchaser offers an
affidavit asserting his bona fide purchase. Furthermore, there is a
presumption against the existence of fraud, and proof to the con-
354. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-113 (creating FLA. STAT. § 817.562 (Supp. 1979)).
355. FLA. STAT. § 817.562(2)(b) (Supp. 1979).
356. U.C.C. (1972 version).
357. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398.
358. Spencer v. Devine, 364 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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trary requires clear and convincing evidence." 9
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held that a lender who refuses to
lend more money to a mortgage company until the borrower re-
duced its overhead is not liable for tortious interference with a
contractual relationship when the borrower company cuts the sal-
ary of all corporate officers. The court in Nitzberg v. Zalesky360
held that the actions of the lender were reasonable and privileged
under the law because a contracting party has a privilege to inter-
fere with another contractual relationship "where the interference
is necessary to protect his own contractual rights provided such
interference is without malice." 1
Franchisors and business licensors should take note of an ad-
dition to the antimonopoly legislation in Florida:
The licensee, or any person deriving title from the licensee, of
the use of trademark and identifiable business format or system
may agree with the licensor to refrain from carrying on or engag-
ing in a similar business and from soliciting old customers of
such licensor within a reasonably limited time and area, so long
as the licensor, or any person deriving title from the licensor,
continues to carry on a like business therein. Said agreements
may, in the discretion of a court of competent jurisdiction, be
enforced by injunction. 6
Finally, the new Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197868
provides for exemptions of property by the bankrupt, unless the
various states reject the federal exemptions in favor of state ex-
emptions. Florida has responded to this invitation by rejecting the
federal exemptions in favor of those provided to Florida residents
by the Constitution of the State of Florida and the Florida
Statutes." '
359. McCrary v. Bobenhausen, 366 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (per curiam).
360. 370 So. 2d 389, 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
361. Id. at 391.
362. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-43 (creating FLA. STAT. § 542.12(2)(b) (1979)).
363. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of tit. 11
U.S.C.A. (West 1979)).
364. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-363 (creating FLA. STAT. § 222.20 (1979)).
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